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Abstract 
This paper establishes the difference between process and outcome differentiation, 
claiming that the former seems to have become reality in the European integration 
process. Concerning the outcome, the author claims that thus far the Union is 
legally defined by its actors to be a harmonisation project, serving the interests of 
EU citizens by means of an economic and increasingly political Union of 
European countries. With that conceptual background, different embodiments of 
differentiation as flexibility instruments with their respective strengths, 
weaknesses, risks and possibilities are analysed, emphasising the distinction 
between differentiation within and outside the Union framework and the 
respective policy areas in which differentiation is applied as the decisive 
analytical factors. The author comes to the conclusion that differentiation on a 
temporary basis within the Union framework is the most integration-friendly way 
of differentiation. However, permanent closer cooperations inside as well as 
outside the Union framework will not entirely vanish from the cooperation habits 
of the member states. A crucial feature in this connection is the perception of the 
European integration process as being open-ended. 
A crucial task will be to communicate process differentiation to the citizens of 
the EU as well as to external actors interacting with the Union. The aim has to be 
that differentiation is perceived as a normal and natural feature of the European 
integration project and not as a weakness or shortcoming. To achieve this, the 
member states and the European Commission have to take steps to allow 
enhanced cooperation to become a practiced and effective integration tool of the 
same value as traditional integration means. Additionally, the notion of an “EU of 
Projects in a multi-way integration process” could contribute to solving the 
dilemma between increased complexity and the difficult relationship between the 
EU and its citizens. 
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1 Introduction1 
The inclusion of differentiation has been a highly controversial 
issue in the debate about the future path of the European integration 
process. Against the background of a certain ‘integration density’, the 
political character of recent integration projects as well as EU 
enlargement, the tendency to debate differentiation seems the 
prevailing new aspect of European integration or, even more, seems to 
increase in relevance. This debate is also linked to a major challenge 
that the EU faces in times of financial, economic and constitutional 
crisis, which is the increasing tendency towards a greater re-
nationalisation of politics or the shifting focus towards national 
material interests. This is accompanied by increasing euroscepticism 
on the part of European citizens, which raises the questions of the 
relevance and validity of European solidarity, especially in the 
relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states (compare, for 
example, Tcherneva 2009). It seems to become more and more of a 
problem that “[w]e compete for what we can get out of the European 
Union, rather than on what we can achieve collectively through it” 
(Ley Berry 2009). The financial and economic crisis has aggravated 
the rifts “between east and west, rich and poor, new and old” and has 
put “[t]he sense of solidarity within Europe […] under strain” 
(Miliband 2009), one example being the discussion about the 
appropriate means to handle the crisis2 (Runner 2009). 
For all these reasons, there is a need to give increased attention to 
flexible integration mechanisms and to establish new concepts, with 
the goal of adjusting the picture of flexible integration means and to 
clarify their added value for the European integration process. In 
contrast to the predominant literature on differentiation, the relevant 
concepts applied in this paper are the distinction between process and 
outcome differentiation, followed by the analysis of four different 
embodiments of differentiation within and outside the EU framework 
according to their effects on the integration process. Additionally, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
1 This Master thesis is based on a discussion paper the author wrote for Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin when she was an intern with SWP from 3 
November 2008 to 30 January 2009. 
2 For example, signs that richer member states intend to try and buy their way out of 
the crisis, an option not open to central and eastern countries, have alarmed the 
newer member states and raised the fear of economic nationalism and increasing rifts 
between euro-in- and outsiders (Mahony, 2009d). 
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relevance of the respective policy areas when applying flexible 
integration means is outlined. The conclusive part of the paper is 
twofold. It firstly recommends stressing the open-endedness of the 
European integration process and, secondly, it focuses on the effect of 
differentiation on the relationship between the EU and its citizens, 
bringing forward the concept of an “EU of Projects in a multi-way 
integration process” as a possible approach to tackle this problematic 
relationship. 
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2 Process vs. Outcome 
Differentiation 
The overall ideal of the European Union, which is to achieve and 
preserve homogenous integration of its member states in order “to 
continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”3, still seems to be the unanimously pursued goal of 
the member states and the institutions of the EU, as it has been written 
into the treaties and repeatedly interpreted by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)4. The core idea of the European project is, therewith, 
positive integration through harmonisation of national legislation 
(Thym 2006, 647) as the 27 European countries agree that “across the 
board, more objectives are likely to be achieved by pooling 
sovereignty than by preserving it intact” (Ley Berry 2009). However, 
there appears to be increasing acknowledgement that the norm of 
absolute homogeneity in the process5 (and not so much in the 
outcome) of integration has to be, at least partly, abandoned against 
the background of substantial deepening and geographical widening. 
This conclusion can firstly be drawn from academic debates 
demanding the renunciation of the “illusion of absolute convergence” 
(Winkler 2009, 283) in the European integration process and the 
acknowledgement that “differentiation has come to stay”, meaning 
that it has become “a norm rather than an exception” in the European 
project (for many: Marcussen 2008, 2; Dyson & Marcussen 2009, 3, 8, 
25 f.; Emmanouilidis 2008, 13; Zervakis 2006, 206). Secondly, the 
notion of ‘juste retour’6 has generally been discredited today and 
political actors acknowledge that different inputs can, or rather will, 
generate different outputs for different countries. Thirdly, flexible 
approaches to harmonisation already exist in the form of various 
                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Preamble and Art. 1 (2) of the Treaty on European Union, since Maastricht Treaty. 
4 The most prominent examples are the ruling of the ECJ in Van Gend & Loos 
(1963) and Costa/E.N.E.L (1964) about the principle of supremacy of EC Law, by 
that establishing the principle of homogeneity of EC Law (compare Thym 2006, 
637). 
5 In this study process is not to be understood as ordinary, every-day policy-making 
but rather as the way policy issues are addressed or handled on a higher, more 
abstract level. For example, the European Monetary Union is handled with the help 
of an opt-out integration process instead of an all-countries-encompassing strategy, 
as the latter is not feasible. 
6 This concept stands for the idea that each country – mainly in terms of money – 
gets out of the European enterprise what it puts into it. 
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flexibility instruments, causing a kind of ‘patchwork’ integration 
process. Tools for states to have varying participation options in 
different policy areas, such as transition periods, opt-outs/opt-ins or 
enhanced cooperation, allow for a large amount of differentiation in 
the implementation stage, but without abandoning the overarching 
ideal of harmonisation.7 Those tools reflect EU regulation that takes 
into account the diversity of member states. Fourthly, more and more 
raised voices demand an end to the repeated misuse of differentiation 
as a threat aiming only to put pressure on states unwilling to 
cooperate, and instead to view it as a strategic opportunity in a bigger 
and more heterogeneous EU (for many: Emmanouilidis 2008, 13). 
Fifthly, differentiation is increasingly regarded as supporting the 
integration process of the whole Union. In this sense, a non-
simultaneous partial harmonisation brings about a ‘more common’ 
status as the continuation of 27 different national legislations. For 
example, the harmonisation of a uniform assessment base for 
corporate taxation in, lets say, 20 member states abolishes differences, 
if not totally then at least in part. Furthermore, this does not lead to 
new distortions of competition that have not already existed before 
(Thym 2006, 647). In this regard, the paradox of the dynamic or 
flexible interpretation of European legislation as a necessity for the 
preservation of the Union’s unity is solved. 
Against this background, the general logic of the European 
integration process does not seem to have changed, as forms of 
flexibility have always been a part of the process. Nevertheless, three 
more specific aspects should be considered: Firstly, due to the 
increasing diversity of interests and the growing complexity of the 
decision-making process in the EU, which is magnified by 
enlargement, there could be a demand for even more process 
differentiation than already exists today. Additionally, European 
citizens demand state-like activities from the EU in areas ranging from 
justice and home affairs, foreign, security and defence policy to 
environmental, economic and social policy, which not all member 
states can achieve at the same time and with the same intensity. 
Secondly, and connected to the first, there has to be a discussion on 
the appropriate means and, therefore, embodiment of differentiation in 
regard to its effects on the integration process. Thirdly, one could 
expect a higher demand for the clarification of differentiation as being 
‘normal’ in the integration process towards Europe’s citizens and 
external actors the EU interacts with. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Emmanouilidis demonstrates this by preferably using the term ‘pre-ins’ instead of 
‘outs’ for countries not (yet) participating in, for example, enhanced cooperation. 
Therewith he emphasises the desired temporary character of differentiation, which in 
the end should lead to harmonisation including all member states (2008, 20). 
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As stated, the focus of the demands for differentiation seems to be 
on the integration process. However, considering the different 
conceptions concerning the future of the European integration process 
that member states allegedly have today, one could also identify a call 
for flexibility concerning the outcome (or end) of European 
integration.8 Those calls are, however, mainly interpretations by 
political science scholars and thereby only implicitly taken from the 
political process and are never explicitly mentioned by political actors, 
as this would contradict the treaties and, with them, the overall ideal 
on which the EU is founded. 
In short, the call for and implementation of process differentiation 
appears to have become reality in the integration process, whereas 
outcome differentiation is at best implicitly involved in those calls, or 
only inherent in the academic debate. In general, the primacy of the 
goal of concerted European integration remains. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Those conceptions move along a continuum with the goal of a United States of 
Europe on the one extreme and a loose economic union without any political 
competences on the other. 
Note on Terminology 
In the following ‘differentiation’ is to be understood as ‘process 
differentiation’. If ‘outcome differentiation’ is meant, this is 
explicitly stated. 
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3 Factors, Questions, Limitations 
Concerning the concept of differentiation itself, one has to 
acknowledge that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
differentiation. Many often fall into the trap of perceiving 
differentiation as one single strategy in contrast to a homogeneous 
approach in the integration process. But differentiation can be applied 
in very different ways and it is a widely shared opinion that 
differentiation does not always mean the same in those contexts. For 
example, flexibility may apply to the European project’s participants, 
objectives, pace, or any combination of these (Zervakis 2006, 206). It 
can even comprise non-EU member states, as happened with the 
European Space Agency and the Bologna Process (ibid., 208). In this 
study however, the most decisive factors are the distinction between 
differentiation within and outside the Union framework and the 
respective policy area in which differentiation is applied, concerning 
EU member states only. 
In the respective contexts, differentiation is implemented 
differently and can therefore have a range of effects on the integration 
process which can be completely opposite, having either uniting or 
rather disruptive effects on the European integration process. The task 
therefore is to analyse the different embodiments of differentiation 
according to their risks and possibilities in terms of the integration 
process and ascertain their effect on the cohesion of the Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decisive questions 
 
In order to be able to evaluate the different embodiments of 
differentiation, the concept of ‘integration-friendliness’ (interview 
Martin Marcussen) has to be clarified. Its applied meaning here is 
fourfold: 
 
- When is the cohesion of the Union seriously in danger? 
- Where does fragmentation begin and what does it mean? 
- Which embodiment of differentiation is the least community-
averse and the most integration-friendly and therefore the most 
compatible with the ideal of a homogeneous integration end? 
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Concept ‘integration-friendliness’ 
 
With this information in the background, several issue areas are to be 
analysed: 
- What are the general risks and possibilities linked to the 
application of differentiation? 
- What are the different embodiments of differentiation and what are 
their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats? 
- Which legal aspects are relevant in the application of 
differentiation?9 
- Which political aspects have to be considered? 
- What effects are to be expected for the relationship between the 
Union and its citizens? 
 
Concerning the limitations of this study, it firstly has to be kept in 
mind that this study does not include potential future member states of 
the EU or aspirants for the accession process in general into the 
differentiation debate, which encompasses concepts like ‘association 
plus’, ‘membership minus’ or ‘privileged partnership’.10 
                                                                                                                                 
 
9 This point generally refers only to enhanced cooperation, as this is codified 
primary law laid out in treaties articles. 
10 For a discussion of various forms of affiliation beneath full membership compare 
Emmanouilidis 2008, 34 ff. 
- EU institutional framework: Integration-friendly in the sense 
of the necessity to include the EU institutions, not to 
circumvent the common framework and therewith not making 
the EU institutions redundant. 
- Legitimacy: Integration-friendly in the sense of input 
(relationship between the Union and its people, comprising 
peoples’ trust in and identification with the integration process) 
and output (can the system deliver the demanded services?) 
- Sustainability of flexible integration mechanisms. This is 
linked to the notion that no ‘one size fits all’ approach exists 
concerning differentiated integration means. 
- Dynamic thinking: Integration-friendly in the sense that a 
dynamic development of the integration process in the 
respective policy areas is necessary. This means the 
abandonment of the idea that the ideal is the preservation of the 
status quo. Rather, the path of the integration process has to be 
adapted according to the changing internal and external 
environment of the European project. 
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Secondly, although touching upon it when analysing the 
relationship between the EU and its citizens, the study does not intend 
to give a broad analysis of the ‘democratic deficit of the EU’ debate. 
This does not mean that the issue of the democratic credentials of the 
EU is unimportant here since this topic should certainly be kept at the 
back of the researcher’s mind while conducting the study. However, it 
is definitely not possible to do justice to such a huge topic here and the 
author therefore refers the reader to the impressive amount of 
literature that already exists on this topic. 
Thirdly, the EU’s role as a normative power in international 
politics is touched upon but cannot be elaborated thoroughly as this 
would go beyond the scope of this study, inter alia because of the 
huge amount of existing literature on this topic.11 
Further methodological limitations will be discussed in the 
following section. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
11 Compare for example Manners, Ian, 2002: “Normative Power Europe: a 
contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40 (2), 235-258; 
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler, 2006: The European Union as Global Actor, 
New York: Routledge, 2nd edition; Elgström, Ole and Smith, Michael, 2006: The 
European Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts and analysis, London, 
New York: Routledge. 
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4 Theory and Methods 
4.1 Theory 
Having outlined the analytical path of this study, the theories and 
methods being applied to achieve new analytical conclusions have to 
be described. First of all, this study is designed to be theory-informed 
rather than theory-driven. More precisely, the primary aim is not to 
generate a new theory, but rather, based on a firm theoretical and 
empirical basis, to generate new knowledge and conclusions about the 
issue under study. Along with this, nevertheless, goes a critique of 
established theories that take a harmonious integration process for 
granted. Many theories dealing with the European integration process 
focus more on the search for a ‘general equilibrium’ in the relations 
and policies of the respective actors. In contrast to this, theories are 
needed that take account of the diverse nature of the actors in the 
European integration process and the increasing complexity of policy-
making. They have to accept and position the notion of process 
differentiation in their reasoning instead of simply “fighting” the 
concept as a danger to the integration process. Concrete, this could 
mean for example theories concerned with diversity management 
taking into account different ‘skills’ and opportunities of actors, 
leading to the notion of possible plus-sum games through the 
exploitation of such resources. One could also resort to economic 
theory that depicts diversity as a resource for innovation. Another 
theory strand could consider new institutional developments that take 
account of a differentiated integration process (interview Martin 
Marcussen). 
Touching upon issues like norms, identity and leadership as well 
as power relations between states, the study has to resort to a range of 
existing theories and cannot be based on a single theory strand. 
Having the nation state in the EU as the focus of analysis points to one 
of the main international relations and European integration theory 
strands, which are accounts of rational choice and liberal 
intergovernmentalism focusing on individualistic and materialistic 
  10 
state actor behaviour (Schimmelfenning 2004, 76 ff.; Moravcsik 2003, 
239 f., 243)12. Also, the identification of strong unanimity and, 
therefore, national sovereignty aspirations in the traditional second 
pillar of the EU – here external policy area – points to the importance 
of state and material power as having decisive effects on 
differentiation efforts in that area (Schimmelfenning 2004, 83). 
Equally, the notion of leadership represents a manifestation of the 
continuing importance of material power relations in the context of a 
project like the EU. Here the study is influenced by Moravcsiks’s 
notion of the “relative power of nation-states” and their “asymmetrical 
interdependence” (2003, 247). 
On the other hand, however, analysing differentiation in the 
European integration process touches upon the basic question of what 
the EU is or rather what common aspirations for the EU’s identity 
might be, thus putting the emphasis on the importance of the discourse 
between actors on different levels13. This inclusion of the importance 
of discourses together with the related discussion about norms, values 
and identity relevant in an integration project emphasise the role of 
another main integration theory, social constructivism14. This theory 
has as an underlying predication that the world is socially constructed, 
which means that human agents do not exist independently of their 
social environment and its collectively shared system of meanings 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 5; Risse 2004, 160). It also includes the 
notion that a given EU citizen may have multiple sets of values and 
ambitions, which are reflected on the regional, national and/or 
European level (Bailes 2009, 815). In addition, analysing the effects of 
differentiation on the relationship between the EU and its citizens 
concretises the constructivist influence on this paper. This is 
particularly the case when raising the question of the relevance and 
validity of European solidarity, especially against the background of 
the tendency towards greater renationalisation of politics and 
                                                                                                                                 
 
12 Andrew Moravcsik (1998, 18) describes the general argument of liberal 
intergovernmentalism that “EU integration can best be understood as a series of 
rational choices made by national leaders.” Furthermore, Schimmelfenning (2004, 
80) replicates Moravcsik saying “state governments call the tune in European 
integration. They pursue diverse interests generated at the national, domestic level; 
they engage in hard intergovernmental bargaining; and they are in control of the 
integration process.” 
13 Those include local, regional, national and European, while the focus in this paper 
is on the discourse on the European level. 
14 Compare Checkel (2003, 351, 353), who sees social constructivism as exploring 
“the ways group norms, ideas, and even cultures shape, and sometimes change, the 
identities and interests of political actors.” Social learning and norm diffusion are 
key aspects to explain actor behaviour in the European integration process. 
15 Alyson Bailes relates these multiple sets of values and ambitions to the security 
behaviour of the respective state. It is claimed here that this notion can be 
understood more generally as referring to any policy area. 
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increasing euroscepticism on the part of European citizens. Finally, 
demanding a change of the integration logic also on the part of the EU 
institutions, the study takes into account the importance of institutions 
and institutional change linked to the notion of institutional and actor 
‘learning’ (Checkel 2003, 352 ff.). 
Especially concerning social constructivism, the study offers some 
theoretical contributions. It presents the notion of an EU of Projects 
as a possible way of reconciling the dilemma between increasing 
process differentiation in European integration and improving the 
relation between the EU and its citizens. Connected to this, the study 
will try to sketch out the concept of a multi-way integration process 
that takes into account the necessity and factual existence of process 
differentiation in the European integration project. Additionally, since 
empirical work on the respective policy area relevant for 
differentiation efforts is not very developed, the study can provide 
new inputs for this so-far underdeveloped analytical field. Finally, the 
clarification of terminology and the establishment of the distinction 
between process and outcome differentiation in an open-ended 
integration project like the EU can be defined as small but valuable 
theoretical contributions. 
 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 A Normative Constructive Approach 
 
Given the issue under study, the methodological approach is of a 
normative qualitative nature, as this paper deals with issues like shared 
or distinct beliefs and values between various players that surround 
political actions (Seale et al 2004, 3). In the sense of a qualitative 
study, the way to “prove” or make an academic contribution to a 
problem or issue is to find a way to understand and explain the reasons 
for and the dynamics of a phenomenon, in this case, the development, 
impact and relevance of the concept of differentiated integration in the 
European integration process. John W. Creswell brings the intended 
result of a qualitative study to the point: 
 
The final written report or presentation [of the qualitative study] includes the 
voices of participants, the reflexivity of the researcher, and a complex 
description and interpretation of the problem, and it extends the literature or 
signals a call for action. (2007, 37) 
Note on Terminology 
This study establishes its own set of terminology on differentiated 
integration means. It partly resorts to existing terms but, given the 
huge variety and inaccuracy of most definitions, terms are adjusted 
in order to bring about as much clarity as possible. 
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The assessment of qualitative research is achieved using the criteria of 
validity and reliability.16 Flick writes in this context that “[t]he validity 
of a study is assessed with reference to the object under study” and 
that “[t]he central criteria depend on whether findings are grounded in 
empirical material, […] whether the methods are appropriately 
selected and applied, as well as [on] the relevance of findings and the 
reflexivity of proceedings” (2006, 15). In that sense, the means to 
assure the validity and reliability of this study are presented in the 
following. 
Along the lines of the methodological path taken by Christian 
Fernández (2005), this study follows a ‘normative constructive 
approach’ meaning to strike a balance between idealism and realism, 
to be visionary and realistic at the same time and to combine critique 
with means to change things for the better (Fernández 2005, 18, 41 
ff.). In other words, the thesis intends to provide plausible or workable 
solutions by giving realistic, normative recommendations about a 
specific problem. In concrete terms, the study describes and analyses 
in a normative-constructive way the path of the European integration 
process in harmonisation and differentiation terms and ends up with 
recommendations on the further development of the European 
integration process. Departing from the acknowledgement that process 
differentiation is inherent in the integration process, the researcher 
recommends that for a successful – integration-friendly, non-
disruptive – European integration process a change in the overall 
integration logic concerning the communication of the necessity of 
differentiated integration towards the citizens of the EU as well as 
towards external actors is essential. Together with the advice 
concerning the appropriate embodiment of differentiation this 
demonstrates the norm-shaping or -constructing approach of the study. 
By choosing the outlined approach, the author departs from 
conventional approaches or clichés concerning the academic handling 
of differentiation in the European integration process. Many recent 
works on differentiation have either focussed on the discussion about 
the necessity or the danger of a ‘hard core’ of countries driving the 
integration process forward, or on the effect of new instruments like 
‘permanent structured cooperation’17, which would be implemented 
                                                                                                                                 
 
16 Flick also discusses ’objectivity’ as a third criterion in empirical research (2006, 
375 f.). As stated also further below in this paper, the concept of objectivity is not 
seen as an appropriate criterion as a qualitative and social constructivist informed 
study like this is based on the notion of a heterogeneous reality that does not go 
together with the concept of objectivity. 
17 A recommendable work on this issue is the EGMONT institute paper on 
“Permanent structured cooperation and the future of ESDP” by Sven Biscop 
(2008). 
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with the Lisbon Treaty. Those concepts are not irrelevant in the 
differentiation debate, but they have to be imbedded in a broader or 
substantial rather than a purely procedural context (interview Alyson 
Bailes). Whereas this study also deals with procedural issues when 
presenting and evaluating four different embodiments of 
differentiation, the originality and rationale of the study is 
nevertheless its substantial analysis, embedding the procedural debate 
in the broader context of the debate surrounding how the European 
enterprise should work, the importance of the respective policy area as 
well as the claim for a perception change in the debate on 
differentiation. 
The aim of such a constructive study is to bring the existing closer 
to the desirable (Fernández 2005, 44). A normative approach is 
necessary in this study as it touches upon the idea and content of 
European integration, which is an emotionally charged concept that 
does not have a ‘neutral’, objective or common meaning to everyone. 
To discuss the development of the European integration process is to 
talk about norms, values and subjective expectations, which 
necessarily includes talking about what should or should not be 
(Fernández 2005, 10). 
Although the study is not primarily designed to develop new 
theory, it nevertheless intends to make theoretical contributions 
concerning the understanding of the European integration process. 
Methodologically, this means the application of an approach that 
emanates from initial theories and ideas as well as new concepts 
established by the researcher. These will be used and developed to 
analyse and explore the issue under study with the help of qualitative 
text analysis, discourse analysis and expert interviews 
(operationalisation). The result is new contributions to the theoretical 
understanding of the European integration process in a normative 
constructive way as described above (interpretation, explanation). 
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Figure 1: The research process18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving from theory to data and back again suggests a deductive 
approach. Furthermore, establishing the concept of a distinction 
between process and outcome differentiation in the integration process 
before analysing data in form of various embodiments of 
differentiation and the relevance of the respective policy area is 
characteristic of deductive logic (Babbie et al 2007, 9). 
As the researcher provides new normative constructions by 
evaluating the contrasting embodiments of differentiation and by 
claiming a necessary change in the integration logic in the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens and the EU and external actors, the 
limitation of a social constructively informed study mirroring “just 
one representation of the world among many other possible 
representations” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 22) must be emphasised. 
This ‘one representation’ is unavoidably influenced by personal and to 
a certain extent, also political considerations of the researcher. In other 
words, the researcher explicitly distances herself from the 
interpretation of understanding her findings as ‘absolute truth’. 
However, although a researcher potentially skates on thin ice when 
providing normative conclusions, the issue under study would lose its 
value when avoiding that path. Given the thorough theoretical, 
methodological and empirical background of the study, the author is 
confident to be able to provide useful contributions to the academic 
                                                                                                                                 
 
18 Based on the circular, grounded theory approach developed by Flick (2006, 98-100). 
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debate on differentiation in the European integration process also 
precisely because normative conclusions are provided. 
 
4.2.2 Qualitative Text Analysis 
  
Of huge importance – not least for the sake of the validity of the 
approach taken – is a thorough qualitative text analysis by resorting to 
the huge amount of existing literature on differentiation in the 
European integration process, conducting systematic analysis of 
terminological, legal and political matters. As Klaus Krippendorff puts 
it: 
 
[The] qualitative researcher […] interpret[s] text, tr[ies] to make sense of 
relevant parts of it by whatever means, and quote[s] finite stretches from it in 
support of [her] conclusions. (2004, 789) 
 
Flick describes the information from existing literature as “context 
knowledge” that is indispensable for such a study (2006, 58 f.). With 
the help of this type of empirical background the study explores four 
embodiments of differentiation and the relevance of the respective 
policy areas in which differentiation is taking place. Having a 
thorough knowledge of established academic work on differentiation 
is indispensable to further develop this issue area academically. This is 
a necessary feature in order to be able to label the research project 
‘scientific’, which means it has to “be based on previous 
investigations, must take account of results in this area and build on 
them, and distinguish itself from previous investigations on the chosen 
topic” (Titscher et al 2000, 12). 
This method is also the prerequisite for the other two approaches 
applied in this study, expert interviews and discourse analysis. 
Without a thorough background from the existing literature on the 
issue at hand it is not possible to ask sophisticated questions during an 
expert interview (Rapley 2004, 17) or to understand the implications 
of political and academic discourses influencing the topic. 
Additionally, it is not possible to sketch out whether the knowledge 
obtained, for example during expert interviews, is new if a thorough 
presentation of existing knowledge is missing (Kvale 1996, 95). 
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4.2.3 Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse analysis19 is a very important method to be applied in this 
work, which means the constant observance and analysis of current 
political developments and discussions of political actors primarily on 
the European level that very often imply, although mostly not 
explicitly, notions of a differentiated integration process. One example 
is the reaction Nicolas Sarkozy triggered with his idea to create an 
‘economic government’ of the eurozone with himself as ‘leader’, as 
analysed in part 7.5 in this paper. This approach is especially 
important in theoretical terms as it provides opportunities to “detect” 
social constructivist influences on actor behaviour.20 Also – departing 
somewhat from the established definition of discourse analysis 
outlined below – the explicit discourse on the application of 
differentiated integration means must be followed. The most apparent 
case concerns the request to apply enhanced cooperation for the first 
time ever (on divorce law, see below). This discourse provides an 
ideal ground to analyse in a social constructive context how 
knowledge is created through social interaction in which “common 
truths” – on the course of European integration – are created and 
brought into competition with each other (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 
5). 
The underlying definition of ’discourse’ “is the general idea that 
language is structured according to different patterns that people’s 
utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social 
life”, one familiar example being ‘political discourse’. “’Discourse 
analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns.” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 
1) In this sense, the social constructivist discourse surrounding the 
issue of differentiated integration is to be analysed in the sense of “a 
particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an 
aspect of the world)” (ibid., emphasis in the original). In this 
connection it is also necessary to point to the quality of discourse 
analysis as critical, at least in the way it is applied here. ‘Critical’ 
research in this sense means “to investigate and analyse power 
relations in society and to formulate normative perspectives from 
which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
19 There is no single label or definition for the method of discourse analysis 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 23, note 1). This paragraph outlines the ’form’ of 
discourse analysis applied in this study, while drawing back to the huge amount of 
literature existing on this research method, by that resorting to the multiperspectival 
approach in the sense of Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 4), meaning to define “one’s 
own package” of discourse analysis. 
20 Compare Risse (2004, 164) who describes ”[t]he emphasis on communicative and 
discursive practices” as a ”characteristic feature of social constructivist approaches”. 
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possibilities for social change” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 2, own 
emphasis). This critical quality of discourse analysis is very important 
for this study as it adds another theoretical component that the study is 
shaped and informed by. These are rational choice and liberal 
intergovernmentalism theory. It therefore completes the theoretical 
picture linked to the method of discourse analysis21, which is often 
described as being accompanied by the concepts of ‘power’ and 
‘ideology’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 3), combining rational and 
constructivist notions. 
The focus of this study is the discourse on differentiated 
integration means in the European integration process on the 
European political level. In other words, the discourse mainly 
occurring between political state actors, which is, of course, also 
influenced by discourses going on on other levels – nationally, 
regionally etc. A second discourse analysis level is that of academic 
experts, which goes together with the qualitative text analysis 
approach but which must be distinguished from the expert interview 
approach, as the latter does not concern the use of language or the 
implicit influence on the discourse regarding differentiation in 
academic work. Rather, the expert interviews are conducted on 
specific questions and issues related to the topic of the study and are 
therefore not to be viewed as part of a discourse in the sense as it is 
applied here. The political and academic discourse is most prevalent in 
the context of the established distinction between process and outcome 
differentiation. Whereas process differentiation seems to be perceived 
as a reality on both the political and academic level, the existence of, 
or call for, outcome differentiation is to be defined as interpretations 
by political science scholars only and as such solely taken implicitly 
from the political process and never explicitly mentioned by political 
actors, as this would contradict the treaties and with them the overall 
ideal on which the EU is founded. 
4.2.4 Expert Interviews 
 
In order to gain a more thorough insight into particular matters, expert 
interviews with scholars working on differentiation in the European 
integration process were conducted. The interviews are to be 
understood as a supporting or complementary method or a means to 
                                                                                                                                 
 
21 Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 3 f.) emphasise the importance of viewing the 
methodological and theoretical study as a harmonious whole when applying 
discourse analysis (notion of the “complete package”). Steinar Kvale points to the 
importance of theoretical clarity connected to qualitative research in general (1996, 
10 f.). 
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get new input for the debate on differentiation in the European 
integration process. Two experts have been chosen on the grounds of 
their academic interest and work on differentiation. The first 
interview, with Martin Marcussen from the University of Copenhagen, 
had the newly established concepts of the researcher (process vs. 
outcome differentiation) and the possible theoretical research 
contribution of the study in focus. The second interview, with Alyson 
Bailes from the University of Iceland, was centred on the role of the 
respective policy area in connection with differentiated integration 
means. Both interviews had, in a sense, the purpose of testing new 
concepts and new knowledge established by the researcher. 
Additionally, the second interview in particular but also to some 
extent the first, had explorative lineaments in the sense that new ideas 
and concepts for the study were detected (compare Kvale 1996, 97 f. 
on explorative and hypothesis testing interviews). The two topic areas 
were chosen as they represent the most important original research 
contributions of this study and given their newness, they increasingly 
need to be discussed regarding their implications for the study of the 
European integration process. A lot of useful and elaborate material 
could be gained from these interviews, facilitated by the fact that both 
interviewees are well established in academia. 
The overall aim of the interviewer was to encourage the 
interviewees to give “thick descriptions” or “elaborated and detailed 
answers” (Rapley 2004, 15, emphasis in the original) on the chosen 
topic area, which reveals the quality of the interviews as semi-
structured22. Sending an outline of the topic including questions and 
small informative paragraphs a few days in advance facilitated this. 
For the actual conducting of the interview it was very important for 
the researcher not to be too fixed on the prepared outline, in the sense 
that she should “not strictly delimit the talk to [her] predetermined 
agenda” (Rapley 2004, 18). It was rather more a means to trigger the 
discussion, which led to a smooth flow of information. The outline 
was nevertheless important to keep the interviewee on track, providing 
some kind of a guideline to prevent deviations. In general, when 
conducting the interview the researcher was led by Rapley´s advice: 
 
[I]nterviewers don’t need to worry excessively about whether their questions 
and gestures are ‘too leading’ or ‘not empathetic enough’; they should just get 
on with interacting with that specific person (2004, 16, 20, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
22 Kvale (1996, 124) describes this type of interview as having “a sequence of 
themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions”, whereas an openness to 
change is an essential characteristic. Rapley uses the term ”qualitative” interviews 
(2004, 15). 
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The method of interviewing applied in this study is based on the idea 
of “the active interview” laid out by Holstein and Gubrium (2004). 
‘Active’ in this sense means to understand the interview as a form of 
interactive and interpretive activity between interviewer and 
interviewee, in contrast to the frequently stated opinion that 
researchers should keep their involvement to the minimum by trying to 
be little more than a “fly on the wall” during the interview (Holstein & 
Gubrium 2004, 140 f.). Accordingly, the interviewee should not only 
be seen as a “vessel of knowledge” (Holstein & Gubrium 2004, 144 
f.), who will only provide valid answers if the researcher is neutral and 
unbiased and with that remains as passive as possible in the production 
of knowledge process.23 Therefore, in contrast to the positivist idea of 
the existence of an ‘objective reality’ and in line with a social 
constructivist stance, the approach presented here neglects the 
existence of ‘pure’ or entirely objective knowledge that has to be 
extracted from the respondent in as uncontaminated a method as 
possible. The aim rather is to trigger a discussion on the topic at hand 
instead of conducting a strict question-and-answer game, as the latter 
would not do justice to a complex and normatively loaded topic such 
as differentiation. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
23 Steinar Kvale describes this with the metaphor of ”the interviewer as a minor” 
who tries to ”seek nuggets of essential meaning […] waiting in the subject’s interior 
to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner” in contrast to the metaphor of “the 
interviewer as a traveller” that involves a conversational approach in order to 
construct new knowledge (1996, 3 ff.). 
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5 Open-endedness: Purpose 
instead of Outcome 
It has to be mentioned again that even if from a political science 
perspective it is often claimed that ‘homogenous integration’ is de 
facto no longer existent because of the various forms of differentiation 
already inherent in the European integration process and accelerated 
through the process of enlargement, the political ideal or norm of a 
unified community converging towards the open-end of a 
homogenous integrative status is still existent. In this regard, the 
emphasis is on the open-endedness of the EU project (for many: 
Emmanouilidis 2008, 10, 19; Thym 2006, 640; Bailes 2009a, 8; Bailes 
2009b, 2). This makes all speculations about the EU becoming a 
federal state or, the opposite, only a loose economic alliance of states 
redundant. Many scholars at least implicitly argue in favour of 
outcome differentiation when denying that the integration process is 
intended to move towards a ‘harmonious whole’. But by rejecting the 
idea of the integration goal as a ‘common destiny’ for the member 
states of the Union, they themselves fall into the trap of trying to 
define the end-state of the Union, be it explicitly by proposing a ‘EU à 
la carte’ due to increased differentiation or implicitly by simply 
denying the intention of the Union as a harmonisation project. Instead 
of debating the ‘outcome’, the ‘intention’ or the ‘purpose’ that the 
Union has been created for should be emphasised. This is to benefit 
the European people through an economic and increasingly political 
Union. According to the treaties, the means by which to fulfil this 
purpose is via the increasing harmonisation of the policies of EU 
member states, even though with various possibilities for process 
differentiation. This consensus has not been abandoned yet. If those 
means turn out to be no longer appropriate to fulfil the Union’s 
purpose, decision-makers are expected to adapt European regulation 
respectively. 
When observing the policy areas concerned which differentiation 
has already been applied to or about which there is a debate regarding 
its necessity, one can ascertain that the whole range of policy areas is 
affected by this development, be it financial, monetary or social 
policy, justice and home affairs, environment and climate policies or 
common foreign and security policy. The integration process also 
already contains a quite large amount of differentiation, be it various 
opt-outs concerning for example the Schengen agreement and EMU or 
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transition periods concerning new member states to the Union. A more 
recent form of flexibility has been the rather inflationary usage of 
extraordinary meetings of just a group of countries to address specific 
issues, for example a meeting in Berlin of six member states on 22 
February 2009 to prepare for the G20 summit in London or a mini-
summit of nine central and eastern European countries on 1 March 
2009 to debate the economic crisis (Mahony 2009c). In addition, there 
is a quite constant debate about further process differentiation, for 
example in security and defence or the recent French proposal for an 
‘economic government’ of the eurozone. Given this large range of 
application for differentiation tools, the general risks and possibilities 
connected to them have to be addressed. 
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6 General Risks and Possibilities 
An overall concern pertinent to all forms of differentiation is the 
dissolution of integration efforts and/or the prevention of further 
integration, in short, the tearing apart of the Union.24 This is especially 
prevalent in terms of outcome differentiation but also to process 
differentiation because of the very nature of the concept. 
Differentiation is to be defined as the departure from the general 
principle of homogeneity of the EU which says that all member states 
participate similarly and realise the same matters at the same time 
(Müller-Graff 2007, 129, 131; Zervakis 2006, 206). Against the 
background of the above definition this is a legitimate concern. That is 
the reason why every proponent of the concept of differentiation 
emphasises the necessity of maintenance to a binding integration core 
– at least in the single market, competition and trade policy – for all 
member states as a basic condition for ‘healthy’ differentiation 
(compare, for example, Cromme 2007, 827). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, many criticise the increased complexity and lack of 
transparency due to the application of differentiation in an already 
complicated endeavour like the European integration process, 
endangering the overall coherence and consistency of the Union (for 
many: Zervakis 2006, 207). This would only intensify the lack of 
democratic credentials of the European Union by deepening the rift 
between elites and citizens, consequently strengthening the 
bureaucratic and undemocratic nature of the Union. 
The possibilities linked to differentiation embrace first and 
foremost the overcoming of blockades and/or lack of political will to 
move the integration process forward. The concept is also understood 
                                                                                                                                 
 
24 Joschka Fischer, for example, in his speech at Humboldt University named the 
danger of the loss of European identity, of internal coherence and with that the 
danger of the internal erosion of the EU (2000, 27 f.). 
Note on Terminology 
The ‘binding integration core’ is not to be confused with the 
concept of a ‘core Europe’ or ‘core EU’. In this paper the latter is 
labelled ‘avant-garde EU’ or ‘centre of gravity’ in order to use 
‘core’ only in one context so as to avoid creating confusion. 
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as a means to prevent a ‘dilution of integration’ (wider but weaker) as 
a consequence of enlargement (Zervakis 2006, 210). Furthermore, 
differentiation can increase the EU’s effectiveness, efficiency and 
capability of policy-making and contribute to the endeavour to keep a 
Europe of 30+ governable. This is just a general point, usually 
connected to differentiation efforts. More concrete risks and 
possibilities vary according to the different embodiments of 
differentiation and will be illustrated in the following chapters. 
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7 Embodiments of 
Differentiation: Inside vs. Outside 
the Union Framework 
The most important distinction has to be drawn between 
differentiation inside and outside the Union framework, distinguishing 
between institutional (or formal) and political (or informal) 
differentiation.25 The inside-outside distinction can be understood as 
an umbrella concept for several embodiments of differentiation, such 
as an EU of different speeds, avant-garde Europe, opt-out policy and 
politics of alliances. 
The inside-outside distinction can in some cases be blurred to the 
extent that, besides the formal treaty texts, the so-called “living 
constitution of the EU” (Marcussen 2008, 11) has to be kept in mind. 
According to this concept, procedures and structures as they are 
described in legal texts may not correspond to every-day decision-
making practices that tend to be informal, multi-level and elusive in 
character (ibid.). Whenever detected, this aspect will be highlighted. 
The existence of institutional tools for differentiation in the treaties 
mirrors the fact that the member states –often called ‘Masters of the 
treaties’ – have translated the necessity for process differentiation into 
treaty articles. The most apparent was the introduction of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ into the Treaty of Amsterdam, whose regulation has been 
reformed through the Treaty of Nice. The most important change was 
that originally the Council had to decide unanimously in order to 
authorise enhanced cooperation. According to Nice, only qualified 
majority voting (QMV) is necessary to allow enhanced cooperation 
(Art. 11 (2) TEC in both cases). The Lisbon Treaty introduced a 
distinction by policy area: According to Art. 329 (1) TFEU26, the 
Council decides with QMV if enhanced cooperation is authorised “in 
one of the areas covered by the Treaties, with the exception of fields 
of exclusive competence and the common foreign and security 
policy”. Authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation in the 
area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shall be granted 
                                                                                                                                 
 
25 For an overview see Appendix 1: Differentiation inside and outside the European 
Union framework. 
26 “TFEU” stands for the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
consolidated version as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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by a decision of the Council acting unanimously (Art. 329 (2) TFEU). 
Additionally, in contrast to Nice, where eight member states were the 
minimum threshold for enhanced cooperation (Art. 43 (g) TEU), 
Lisbon sets nine countries as the minimum (Art. 20 (2) TEU-L27). 
The treaties contain some more features of flexibility in the area of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. One example is the so-called 
instrument of ‘constructive abstention’, which is laid out in Art. 31 
TEU-L. This provision constitutes that abstentions by a member state, 
accompanied by a formal declaration, do not mean that the member 
state in question is obliged to apply the decision but must accept that it 
commits the Union. The member state must then refrain from any 
action that might conflict with Union action based on that decision. In 
other words, the abstaining member state allows the other states to 
move ahead on a CFSP issue. 
Another example is ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in the area 
of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) according to Art. 42 
(6) and 46 TEU-L, as well as to Protocol 10 on Permanent Structured 
Cooperation of the Treaty on European Union. This is an instrument 
for member states “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria 
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in 
this area with a view to the most demanding missions” to establish 
closer forms of cooperation within the framework of the EU (Art. 42 
(6) TEU-L).28 
Given these provisions, one would expect that it is logical for the 
actors in the integration process to use the EU’s own tools to 
implement the necessary process differentiation. However, the most 
general legal differentiation instrument, enhanced cooperation, has 
never been used! Obviously there is great hesitance towards using this 
legal tool to steer the EU’s own integration development. Many 
scholars dealing with differentiation heavily criticise this non-usage of 
enhanced cooperation (for many: Emmanouilidis 2008, 10). Their 
argument is that differentiation outside the Union framework – or 
“extra-EU cooperation” as Emmanouilidis puts it – is often imperfect, 
unbound and arbitrary, which potentially leads to suboptimal results 
and could even harm the EU. In contrast, flexible cooperation within 
the Union framework provides a remarkable number of advantages: 
                                                                                                                                 
 
27 “TEU-L” stands for the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
28 For an overview on enhanced cooperation, constructive abstention and permanent 
structured cooperation compare Emmanouilidis 2008, 18 f. 
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Advantages of flexible cooperation within the Union framework 
 
Political or informal differentiation approaches are closer to classical 
alliance policy between countries and therefore harder to keep under 
control. This could consequently harm the community method. A very 
important point is, furthermore, the problem of double structures that 
creates inefficiency and waste of resources. Differentiation outside the 
Union framework is nevertheless taking place and is sometimes even a 
necessary condition for successful differentiated policy making. More 
can be read on this issue below in paragraph 7.4 ‘Outside: politics of 
alliances’. 
7.1 Inside: Different Speeds – Same Degree 
of Integration for all Member States 
One way of establishing differentiation within the Union framework is 
the creation of changing leading coalitions or ‘islands of differentiated 
integration’ (Weidenfeld et al 2006, 12), which could work as a 
catalyst for more integration in the respective policy area. This is to be 
understood as a group of countries integrating further within the 
respective policy area and therewith paving the way for other more 
reluctant countries. Crucial in this context is the idea of providing a 
learning environment or process for these hesitant countries through 
- These tools respect and benefit from the Union’s single 
institutional framework. 
- They preserve the supranational powers and composition of the 
Commission, the EP and the ECJ and 
- they limit the anarchic and uncontrolled use of flexibility, 
therewith guaranteeing a high level of calculability due to the 
existence of clear rules concerning the initiation, functioning 
and scope of differentiated cooperation. 
- Through its high degree of openness and the involvement of the 
EP and national parliaments this form of cooperation ensures a 
high level of democratic legitimacy. 
- It enables the continuous development of the EU’s acquis in 
line with the requirements of the treaties and in that sense also 
reduces the overall risk of a confrontational split between the 
in- and outsiders of such a cooperation. (Emmanouilidis 2008, 
9, 19-23) 
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which they will be encouraged to follow the leading countries and thus 
catch up in terms of the integration process. 
Such a form of differentiation has also been referred to as ‘hubs 
and spokes’, which would lead to the creation of an ‘open space of 
gravity’ (Weidenfeld et al 2006, 13) consisting of the sum of all 
cooperation projects. It is crucial that those projects remain open to all 
member states, but in order to ensure success, certain conditions for 
participation have to be established. The result can be labelled a 
temporary EU of different speeds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first example of non-simultaneous integration was established in 
the Maastricht Treaty with the agreement to allow different speeds 
when implementing the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Thym 
2006, 639). A more recent example illustrating that an EU of different 
speeds is increasingly perceived as real is the current strive of many 
countries to adopt the euro as soon as possible. This policy is widely 
perceived as a reaction to the financial crisis and a means to enter the 
‘safe haven’ of the euro zone. Another interpretation would be that the 
countries are reacting to the Lisbon crisis, which has been 
accompanied by speculations about countries, which tend to bloc all 
Note on Terminology 
In order to bring as much clarity as possible into “the Babylonian 
terminology chaos” (Müller-Graff 2007, 129) surrounding the 
concept of differentiation, it is important not to confuse ‘Europe’ and 
‘EU’ when introducing the names of the single differentiation 
embodiments. The difference shall be illustrated by the following 
example: A ‘Europe of different speeds’ includes potential future EU 
member states and aspirants for the accession process in general. 
This potentially includes concepts like ‘association plus’, 
‘membership minus’ or ‘privileged partnership’. On the other hand, 
an ‘EU of different speeds’ only refers to the member states of the 
EU, the current EU-27. 
The former concept is linked to the broad issue area of enlargement 
and therefore adds another layer of differentiation to the picture. In 
order not to confuse the inside-outside Union framework distinction 
established here, the focus is on ‘EU’ rather than on ‘Europe’. 
The same applies for example to the terms ‘avant-garde EU/Europe’ 
and ‘two-class EU/Europe’. The commonly used term ‘Europe à la 
carte’ does note really make sense in this regard as it is intended to 
mean the ability to pick and chose from EU and not European policy 
areas. 
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remaining member states, that could be called upon to let the others 
move forward.29 More precisely, they anticipate that the EU of 
different speeds is up and coming or already existent and the euro 
group will be the best integrated, most advanced, in short, ‘speediest’ 
part of the EU. Therefore, they channel their efforts to belong to this 
group in order not to be left behind. 
7.1.1 Institutionalisation: Enhanced Cooperation 
As has already been touched upon above, it seems crucial to explore 
and practice the legal instruments of differentiation, which could 
provide the basis for community-friendly process differentiation. This 
is especially evident in the case of enhanced cooperation, which 
scholars often describe as ‘the central tool of differentiation’ and 
which provides the legal means for changing leading coalitions in the 
EU integration process. These are laid out in Title IV “Provisions on 
Enhanced Cooperation” in the Treaty on European Union30 and Part 
Six, Title III in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union31. According to those provisions, member states can establish 
enhanced cooperation “between themselves within the framework of 
the Union’s non-exclusive competences” excluding common foreign 
and security policy32 and “may make use of its [the Union’s] 
institutions”. In addition to this, “enhanced cooperation shall aim to 
further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce 
its integration process” by remaining open “at any time to all Member 
States”.33 The conditions for the implementation of enhanced 
cooperation are that the Council decides that “the objectives of such 
cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the 
Union as a whole” and that at least nine member states participate.34 
Additionally, “such cooperation shall not undermine the internal 
market or economic, social and territorial cohesion” of the Union and 
is not allowed if it leads to a “barrier to or discrimination in trade 
between Member States” or if it distorts competition within the 
Union.35 Finally, the acts adopted within the framework of enhanced 
cooperation “shall bind only participating Member States” and they 
                                                                                                                                 
 
29 Especially in the case of Ireland after the negative referendum in June 2008. 
30 Art. 20 TEU-L, Art. 27a – 27e, 40b, 43 – 45 TEU (Nice). 
31 Art. 326 – 334 TFEU, Art. 11, 11a TEC (Nice). 
32 Art. 329 (1) TFEU. 
33 Art. 20 (1) TEU-L, Art. 328 TFEU. 
34 Art. 20 (2) TEU-L. 
35 Art. 326 TFEU. 
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“shall not be regarded as part of the acquis which has to be accepted 
by candidate States for accession to the Union.”36 
No one knows yet if these primary law provisions work in 
practice. Ten countries were making an attempt on divorce legislation 
but the Commission is still very hesitant to allow such a move. In July 
2008 Austria, Bulgaria, France (since January 2009), Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Spain have 
decided to formally request the European Commission to launch the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism after the 27-nation bloc has been 
unable for over two years to introduce pan-European rules in order to 
clarify which law should apply in cases where a married couple in 
which the husband and wife come from different countries wants to 
get divorced. Sweden blocked an EU-wide agreement fearing that EU 
harmonisation in the area could threaten its liberal family law. Under 
the debated rules, if a mixed nationality couple decides to divorce, 
spouses would be allowed to choose the competent court and the law 
to apply to their case. Should they fail to agree, the couple would be 
automatically referred to a court in their place of residence (Goldirova 
2008). The ten member states argue that, at present, it is too easy for 
husbands or wives in international marriages to take action in courts 
where they feel they will get the best divorce settlement - a form of 
‘litigation shopping’. The draft legislation, introduced by the 
Commission in 2006, known as Rome III, would combat this by 
harmonising the rules courts use to determine which national law 
should apply in cases where the husband and wife have different 
nationalities, live in different member states, or live outside of their 
home member state. As the draft legislation has stalled in the Council 
of Ministers there would be no other way forward for the willing 
member states than to apply enhanced cooperation (Brunsden 2008). 
Jacques Barrot, Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, 
must weigh up the opportunities and the potential risks of using this 
unexplored and untried mechanism for the first time. The Commission 
has been examining the possibility of enhanced co-operation since 
July 2008, but has yet to deliver its verdict, which is expected before 
the end of the current Commission’s mandate, scheduled for 
November 2009. Mr Barrot has been rather critical on the process 
stating that he feels a political “critical mass” seems to be lacking for 
the case to succeed (Brunsden 2009a/b). He grounds this estimation 
basically on the fact that other countries – Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK – are opposed to 
applying enhanced cooperation to divorce law. 
The application of flexibility can complicate the picture in many 
ways. For example, there are concerns that complex legal tangles 
                                                                                                                                 
 
36 Art. 20 (4) TEU-L. 
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could result in cases where one partner comes from a country 
participating in Rome III and the other does not (Brunsden 2008). 
Therefore many possible situations and repercussions of such a move 
have to be considered by the Commission when drafting its proposal 
for the Council. Furthermore, the Commission and some member 
states fear that a precedent will be set that could lead to the 
fragmentation of the Union. If Rome III is adopted and is seen to 
improve the legal environment, then member states will be less 
reluctant to resort to enhanced co-operation in future (ibid., Brunsden 
2009a). While the former concern about the consideration of 
repercussions through the application of enhanced cooperation is 
thoroughly legitimate and demands utmost prudence in the process, 
the reaction to the latter must surely be that the whole point of writing 
a procedure into the treaty is that there is the political will to use it. 
Otherwise, it has to be defined as mere lip service, acknowledging that 
the procedure is necessary but with the tacit understanding that it will 
never find its way into practice. It is beyond doubt that the application 
of a procedure like enhanced cooperation has to be developed very 
carefully because of the complications it can cause and because of the 
effects on basic understandings of the European integration process. 
This, however, cannot mean the refusal to ever use this procedure in 
the real world and keeping it only as a paper tiger. 
It is not only the Commission that is quite hesitant towards the 
application of enhanced cooperation. Also, the member states have so 
far very seldom resorted to the possibility of introducing enhanced 
cooperation. An explanation could be that member states are afraid of 
applying flexible instruments because even if they cannot be forced to 
follow others who go ahead in certain areas they might experience an 
identity or value crisis. They fear ending up in a situation of peer 
pressure to follow other countries even if they would not under 
different circumstances. 
Another explanation can be derived from a situation observed by 
Jolyon Howorth. He claims that a problem frequently encountered 
both in European integration in general and in the area of CFSP/ESDP 
in particular is that member states, having decided for a variety of 
external constraining reasons that it was necessary to set up a 
‘centralizing’ institution, immediately became nervous of their own 
temerity and began trying to keep the new body under their own firm 
control (Howorth et al 2007, 71). The same seems to hold true for the 
instrument of enhanced cooperation. Member states first agree that 
they need the tool and write it into the treaties, but once confronted 
with its actual existence and even upcoming application, they shy 
away in the fear of losing control, being left behind or outside the 
process in any policy area by setting a precedence. 
One crucial point yet to be explored is whether the legal provisions 
are perhaps too tight for enhanced cooperation to be a workable 
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instrument (Zervakis 2006, 207 f.). This has to be debated against the 
background of necessary caution in applying differentiation because 
of its potential disruptive effects. The authorisation procedure for 
enhanced cooperation has to follow a strict legal and political 
procedure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authorisation procedure for enhanced cooperation 
 
Some would argue that such tight rules should not be seen as a 
‘straight jacket’ to enhanced cooperation as they are necessary in 
order to adhere to Art. 20 (2) TEU-L which states that “[t]he decision 
authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Council as a 
last resort”. Furthermore, from a legal perspective, these rules should 
not be considered as being too tight as they would not impose a 
stricter set of rules on enhanced cooperation than on concerted action 
by all member states (Thym 2006, 645 f.). The only exception is the 
nine member states threshold, which some consider necessary in order 
to avoid exclusive cooperation by the big or founding member states 
and to prevent a fragmentation of the Union into too many small 
groups (ibid., 645). In sum, having a legal as well as a political barrier 
that must be passed in order to initiate enhanced cooperation is an 
essential safeguard in order to guarantee differentiation without 
disruption (Thym 2006, 648 f.). 
Another argument that refutes the opinions on the legal provisions 
as too tight is the reference to the effet utile rule, which has been 
established by the ECJ. According to this interpretation norm a 
European treaty provision or law must always have a meaningful field 
of application in practice. In other words, a provision can never be 
interpreted in such a way that it has no legal effect. Additionally, the 
- First of all, the Commission submits a draft proposal to the 
Council after member states have addressed a request to the 
Commission about their wish to initiate enhanced cooperation. 
- The Council then needs to vote by QMV in favour of allowing 
enhanced co-operation to go ahead (unanimously in the case of 
common foreign and security policy) after it has received 
consent from the EP. 
- At least nine member states then have to agree to participate. 
- All of these participating countries then have to vote on the 
legislation by unanimity for it to enter into force. 
- During this time, any member state can demand that the 
process be suspended and discussed by EU leaders at the next 
European Council. 
- Even if all legal requirements are fulfilled, the Commission, the 
EP or the Council can still refuse their permit on political 
grounds. 
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integration-friendly rulings of the ECJ in past decades suggest a 
favourable approach towards enhanced cooperation (Kurpas et al 
2006, 5). 
In conclusion, it is only the necessity to have nine member states 
in order to initiate enhanced cooperation that might prevent the 
certainly useful application of flexibility in areas where only a smaller 
number of countries would wish to go further. Especially the 
accession of economically and partly politically rather different 
countries to the EU-15 has lead to an even more diverse Union, so that 
rather smaller groups of countries with similar policy interests can be 
expected. On the other hand, a bigger number of member states makes 
the achievement of a certain threshold quite possible than a smaller 
number, so that nine might be a good choice in order to keep the 
balance between flexible process differentiation and the ideal of 
outcome harmonisation. In order to find out if an amount of nine 
countries is practical or if it has to be adjusted in response to the 
countries’ demands, the tool enhanced cooperation has to be explored 
in practice. 
Lastly, one unintended but possible development through the 
application of enhanced cooperation should be illustrated. A core 
aspect of enhanced cooperation is that it must remain open for all 
member states at any time (Art. 20 TEU-L) in order to guarantee its 
quality as a means to a temporary EU of different speeds against the 
background of the harmonisation purpose of the integration process. 
However, the application of enhanced cooperation in certain policy 
areas can inevitably lead to the permanent exclusion of some member 
states and with that to differentiated integration on a permanent basis. 
This would be the case for example in the enhanced cooperation case 
on divorce policy. Malta, which does not even have divorce in its legal 
system, would never join this area of cooperation. Also Sweden, the 
UK and Ireland have demonstrated their absolute opposition to the 
application of foreign divorce law on their territory, which is an 
essential element of the draft legislation. Consequently, enhanced 
cooperation in such cases would lose its ability to function as a 
‘demonstration project’ for other countries to follow later. Legally it 
would remain a project of enhanced cooperation aiming towards the 
participation of as many member states as possible (Art. 328 TFEU). 
But de facto it would mean differentiation on a permanent basis and 
with that, coming close to an avant-garde EU in that specific policy 
area. Such a situation can well be imagined in other policy areas, for 
example foreign and defence policy or even taxation, where national 
traditions and particularities could lead to permanent differentiation. 
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7.2 Inside: Avant-Garde EU – Regional 
Integration within Regional Integration 
One form of differentiation that has been, and still is, visible in the 
differentiation debate, but is mostly rejected because of its likely 
disruptive effects, regards an avant-garde EU (other terminology 
includes triumvirate or centre of gravity)37. The zenith of this debate38 
is found in the famous speech of former German Vice-Chancellor and 
foreign minister Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University in Berlin on 
12 May 2000 entitled “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on 
the Finality of European Integration“. He stated that the instrument to 
master the two big tasks of the EU – Eastern enlargement and political 
integration – is a strong Franco-German alliance which should form 
the avant-garde or a ‘centre of gravity’ for the Union until the 
completion of Robert Schuman´s idea of a European Federation has 
been achieved. This avant-garde should constitute the driving force 
toward the completion of political integration (Fischer 2000, 11, 20 f., 
29). According to some, however, during the last five years – 
especially due to the big enlargement round – the ‘Franco-German 
engine’ is no longer but a new centre of gravity has yet to come up 
(Vucheva 2009; EurActiv 2009). Even more, Alyson Bailes sees “the 
most tricky divisions of prima facie interest and of derived policies 
[…] between the largest states such as France and Germany and 
Britain” and this “may be the simplest answer as to why we have not 
seen any stable ‘hard core’ phenomenon emerging in 21st century 
Europe so far and may never see it” (Bailes 2009b, 4). 
The main difference to the EU of different speeds in conceptual 
terms is that an avant-garde EU establishes differences on a permanent 
basis. Whereas in an EU of different speeds, the overall ends of 
integration remain the same for all countries, in an avant-garde EU 
this is abandoned since it is accepted that a group of countries, a 
centre of gravity, forms the permanent head of the integration process. 
This could be labelled ‘regional integration within regional 
integration’ as permanent blocs of member states would be 
established. Another difference is that the concept of an avant-garde 
EU assumes generally that the same countries form the permanent 
leading group (usually the big states, France, Germany, UK, 
sometimes Italy), whereas in an EU of different speeds changing 
                                                                                                                                 
 
37 One example constitutes the often-claimed German-French-British avant-garde on 
EU security and defence as well as on economic matters (Laumen, Maurer 2006, 19). 
38 In the debate the applied term is usually ‘core Europe’ (see for example the 
Schäuble-Lamers paper from 1994), but for stated reasons of terminological clarity 
‘avant-garde EU’ is preferred here. 
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leading coalitions with different countries can and will emerge, 
according to the policy area concerned. 
From a scholarly perspective, the concepts referring to an avant-
garde EU are generally described as unrealistic and counterproductive 
to the integration process, not least because of their hegemonic 
attributes. Firstly, they are unrealistic, as a predominant majority of 
countries would like to belong to the avant-garde, which would 
contradict the very character of such a group. Furthermore, potential 
avant-garde countries would be forced to actively refuse the wish of 
the remaining countries to participate, which no respected country 
would be happy to do (Weidenfeld et al 2006, 13). Secondly, they are 
counterproductive, as an atmosphere of mistrust between the ‘ins’ and 
the ‘outs’, which would lead to the permanent establishment of a two-
class EU, would be created, having rather disruptive effects on the 
integration process. Consequently, potential benefits from 
differentiation projects would not be achieved, as differentiation 
would be perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity. 
The main obstacle to an avant-garde EU is that it goes hand in 
hand with the concept of periphery. This has especially been criticised 
in the context of integrating new member states, which might be 
willing to join the avant-garde group but may be unable to do so for 
many years to come. In contrast the UK, for example, might be able 
but unwilling to join the centre of gravity (Zielonka 2000, 153). 
Another crucial point is how the excluded countries materially 
perceive the centre and the periphery, namely the centre as “affluent 
and stable” in contrast to the periphery as “impoverished and 
unstable” with a deep dividing line between the two areas. Therefore, 
especially the new member states of the enlargement rounds of 2004 
and 2007 suspect the proponents of an avant-garde EU of deliberately 
trying to keep the less developed Eastern European countries outside a 
more prosperous EU (Zielonka 2000, 153. f.). Václav Havel, former 
President of the Czech Republic, brings the point to bear: 
 
“The idea that there could forever be two Europes – a democratic, stable and 
prosperous Europe engaged in integration, and a less democratic, less stable and 
less prosperous Europe – is, in my opinion, totally mistaken. It resembles a 
belief that one half of a room could be heated and the other half kept unheated 
at the same time. There is only one Europe, despite its diversity.” (quote taken 
from Zielonka 2000, 155) 
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7.3 Inside: Opt-out Policy 
Maybe the most used embodiment of differentiation is the granting of 
opt-outs to certain countries on certain issues.39 Opt-outs are included 
in the EU framework in form of protocols to the Treaty on the 
European Union40 and therefore belong to the primary law of the EU. 
While remaining inside the treaty framework, granting opt-outs is a 
differentiation policy allowing countries to remain outside deepening 
cooperation in certain (sub-)policy areas in contrast to flexibility 
mechanisms under which countries can go further. 
Generally, every differentiation policy can be defined as either 
countries going further or lagging behind. In order to establish the 
difference, it is necessary to use the binding core common to all 
member states as the reference point. In the case of an opt-out it is 
based on parts of this core that countries decide to stay outside, 
meaning they are (willingly) left behind. In the case of enhanced 
cooperation or politics of alliances for example, countries go beyond 
the binding core (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The binding core 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opt-out policy is often welcomed as a very successful tool for 
adherence to the concerns of countries on single issues and to 
overcome overall blockades of integration efforts by allowing certain 
countries to stay out (Corbett 200841). Opt-out policy makes sense, 
since it constitutes a learning process for the countries that are not yet 
ready whilst preserving the EU’s single institutional framework, as 
this form of differentiation does not lead to the creation of new 
                                                                                                                                 
 
39 For an overview of ” Opt-out policy in practice” see Appendix 2. 
40 The rules and procedures regulating an opt-out must be agreed unanimously and 
laid down in the EU’s primary law (protocols to TEU), compare http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML. 
41 He states in the context of opt-out policy: “In the EU, the give-and-take co-
operation of all member countries is fundamental to the continued success of the 
EU.” 
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core 
some countries remain 
willingly left behind, 
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  36 
institutions outside the Union. Additionally, opt-out policy has a 
positive democratic effect as it respects a national majority without 
allowing this group, which is a minority at the European level, to 
prevent the European majority moving forward on a policy issue 
(Thym 2006, 642). Finally, in contrast to enhanced cooperation, this 
constitutes a well-tried mechanism, which does not seem to hurt the 
integration process. Further, some claim that opt-out policy can result 
in new integrationist dynamics, as demonstrated for example by the 
use of opt-ins by the UK and Ireland in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs (Emmanouilidis 2008, 10, 32). A major difference to enhanced 
cooperation is the fact that the differentiated respective acquis, under 
which certain countries enjoy an opt-out, also applies to future 
member states. This means that new member states must respect and 
implement the totally accumulated EU law, even if some older Union 
members have successfully negotiated an opt-out from certain parts of 
the acquis (Emmanouilidis 2008, 32 f.). 
Critics perceive opt-outs as a rather pick-and-chose approach, 
meaning countries simply chose which policy issues whether they 
wish to integrate or coordinate further with other countries or if they 
prefer to keep the national framework. In the German debate, it has 
been referred to as the danger of the EU becoming a 
‘Gemischtwarenladen’ (general merchandise store). Despite the 
quality of opt-outs being a policy of ‘cherry-picking’ or ‘EU à la 
carte’, which potentially makes the EU less transparent and in some 
cases even less coherent and less solidary, some claim that the positive 
integrationist dynamics spurred by opt-out policy result in more 
benefits than harm (Emmanouilidis 2008, 33). 
A crucial point of opt-out policy is the timeframe, or rather, which 
timeframe is perceived. On the one hand, opt-outs are perceived as a 
temporary ‘stepping out of the line’ by certain countries in order to 
give them time to be ready to opt in. This idea would belong to the 
notion of an EU of different speeds but with the same integration ends. 
It comes closer to an EU à la carte if the opt-outs are established and 
perceived as long-term exceptions without the implicit expectation of 
the countries to opt in at some point. The proponents of the concept 
usually perceive the former timeframe whereas opponents refer to the 
risk of permanently fragmenting the Union through the granting of 
opt-outs. 
Whilst there is no legal date of expiry for opt-outs, some 
documents explicitly mention the possibility to opt in if the countries 
wish to do so.42 Additionally, the review of opt-outs is sometimes 
                                                                                                                                 
 
42 This applies to the UK and Ireland concerning the change from unanimous to 
qualified majority voting in the sector of Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters. Furthermore, Denmark has the possibility to change its complete Justice and 
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added, as is the case for the Irish Police and Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters (PJC) opt-out, to be revised three years after the 
Lisbon Treaty enters into force. Finally, naming the respective 
countries as either ‘out’ or ‘pre-in’43 clearly hints to the perception of 
an opt-out policy’s character. Currently, the Danish debate on the 
abandonment of one, several or all of its opt-outs, supports the “pre-
in” or “temporarily out” characterisation.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In connection with granting opt-outs, the grounds upon which those 
opt-outs were (or are) granted should be kept in mind. In many cases, 
the respective governments are in favour of furthering the integration 
process, but the people as a majority are opposed to this. This is true 
for the Danish government who ‘had to’ demand the opt-outs of the 
Edinburgh Agreement in order to guarantee the Danish people’s 
acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 after the treaty had been 
rejected in the first referendum. The current Irish case on the Lisbon 
Treaty is another example. In a constructivist sense, this could be a 
hint of differing “amounts” of identification on the part of the elites 
and the people. Alison Bailes illustrates this quite well when stating: 
 
“When proposed EU advances are struck down in popular referendums, it 
usually means that the elites have got carried away by an emerging club spirit 
while the peoples’ real needs either remain unreconciled, or would have pointed 
in another direction.” (2009, 12) 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Home Affairs (JHA)-opt-out under the Lisbon Treaty to a PJC case-by-case opt-in 
version, as it exists already for the UK and Ireland. 
43 See footnote 7. 
44 For example, on enquiry from the Irish, the Danes reported rather negative 
experiences from the opt-out on certain aspects of defence policy, because they feel the 
Danish decision to opt-out from EU defence in 1992 was to their ultimate disadvantage 
(Mahony 2009a). 
Note on Terminology 
Opt-outs with an indefinite timeframe could technically also be 
considered as policies of an avant-garde EU instead of an EU á la 
carte. The decisive difference between the two concepts is that the 
avant-garde implies the deliberate definition of ‘avant-garde’ by 
those member states that intend to belong to this centre group. In 
other words, they ‘force’ the other states in the periphery, whereas in 
the case of an opt-out or EU à la carte, the countries that remain 
outside chose to do so. In other words, they enable other member 
states to broaden the common binding core getting an individual 
exception for this policy area in return (see also Figure 2 for 
clarification). 
  38 
7.4 Outside: Politics of Alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classical alliance politics mean that a group of countries intensifies 
cooperation on the basis of intergovernmental mechanisms and 
procedures outside the EU framework. This means that cooperation is 
limited to the relations between governments of the participating 
countries and therefore does not include the transfer of sovereignty 
rights to any supranational authority. However, according to Art. 4 (3) 
TEU-L member states participating in such alliance policies must 
adhere to the principle of loyalty and not undermine the functioning of 
the Union. Additionally, this form of closer cooperation is not possible 
in areas where the EU has exclusive competences (Emmanouilidis 
2008, 24). 
Alliances between member states outside the Union framework are 
likely to occur if legal restrictions prevent the usage of intra-EU 
differentiation tools. Concerning the instrument of enhanced 
cooperation this would be the case if cooperation is initiated in areas 
not covered by the EU Treaties, if the number of participating states is 
smaller than the minimum number required, or if the authorisation of 
cooperation cannot be granted since there is no sufficient qualified 
majority in the Council. The latter could especially be the case in the 
field of CFSP, as the initiation of enhanced cooperation in this policy 
area requires a unanimous decision within the Council 
(Emmanouilidis 2008, 24, footnote 21). Apart from legal hindrances, 
political hurdles also potentially cause member states to resort to 
alliance policy. This can be expected especially on issues belonging to 
the so-called domaine réservés, comprising usually foreign policy, 
Note on Terminology 
When stepping outside the Union framework one would expect the 
notion of ‘intergovernmental cooperation’ to come up. However, this 
term is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is to be understood as the 
traditional form of international cooperation between countries in the 
sense of classical alliance politics. On the other, it is a defined term 
for a certain decision-making method of the EU mainly referring to 
Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy according to which 
the European Council – that is, the state governments – acts 
unanimously to the exclusion of supranational bodies. Despite the 
exclusion of the latter, cooperation still takes place within the Union 
framework, as Foreign, Security and Defence policy form the 
traditional 2nd pillar of the Union. In order not to confuse the 
terminology, this part, referring to coordination outside the Union 
framework, is headlined ‘politics of alliances’. 
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security and defence, but in some countries also social policy issues. 
Those are usually policy areas, which a country understands as being 
of crucial importance to its self-conception as a sovereign and 
independent state. 
A group of countries is also expected to resort to politics of 
alliances on grounds of capability. Put differently, they decide to 
move on – if not possible within the framework, maybe on the 
grounds of legal hindrances as described above – outside of the 
framework because other member states do not possess the 
appropriate resources or capabilities to participate in the cooperation. 
The point to be emphasised is that it is not always solely dependent on 
political will, but also on material capabilities if further integration 
within the Union is to work out. This can particularly be expected in 
high cost-intensive areas such as defence policy45. 
As has already been touched upon above, closer cooperation 
outside the EU bears a number of potential risks. It means the 
exclusion of EU institutions as the Commission is deprived of its role 
as guardian of the Treaties and initiator of legislation, the European 
Parliament is deprived of its control functions and its legislative co-
decision rights, and the European Court of Justice is deprived of its 
direct supervisory authorities. The inclusion of outsiders entirely 
depends on the political willingness of participating member states to 
associate them. Other implications are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risks of closer cooperation outside the Union framework 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
45 Compare Bailes (2009, 10) naming defence expenditure and the basic underlying 
military traditions and readiness to reform as the crucial factors. 
- The establishment of new institutions outside the framework, 
which could lead to double structures. 
- The lack of democratic legitimacy on the European and the 
national level due to decreased influence of the EP and national 
parliaments. 
- The decrease of trust and the obstruction of cooperation inside 
the Union through the adoption of procedures and legal norms 
outside the EU, which could potentially lead to conflicts with 
existing or planned Union law. Furthermore, non-participating 
member states and the EU institutions have to accept the 
decisions taken outside the Union as fait accompli if they are 
eventually incorporated into the Union framework. 
- The potential problematic integration of the external legal 
acquis into the EU, as for example in the divorce law case. 
(Emmanouilidis 2008, 26 ff.) 
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Nevertheless, in some cases politics of alliance might be a useful tool 
in order to, as Emmanouilidis puts it, “make a step forward outside the 
Union instead of waiting indefinitely for a small step inside the EU” 
(2008, 10, 24 f.). In order to minimise the risks such a form of 
cooperation poses to the community method, he suggests to follow 
only temporary alliance politics, which should be open to all member 
states with the aim of integrating the legal norms adopted and the 
cooperation initiated outside the Union into the framework as fast as 
possible, following the example of the Treaty of Prüm or the 
Schengen Agreement. In short, this form of cooperation should, 
similar to a EU of different speeds inside the EU framework, work as 
a kind of “laboratory”(Emmanouilidis 2008, 10, 24 f.46), providing a 
ground for the later accession of all member states and incorporation 
into the acquis of the EU. 
The risk that once initiated politics of alliances remain outside the 
EU without being embedded into the legal framework is even more 
prevalent than in the above situation. This illustrates the possibility 
that enhanced cooperation could remain a permanent form of 
differentiation without the prospect of encompassing all member 
states at some near point. Apart from the legal hindrances this is 
especially due to the fact of various still existing forms of domaine 
réservés, which are usually quite immune to being opened up for 
supranational cooperation. Additionally, in contrast to enhanced 
cooperation, no legal, intra-EU order exists, which demands the 
inclusion of all member states as soon as possible. 
7.5 Outside to make Inside possible – a 
Recent Example 
Alongside all pleas for more differentiation in the integration process, 
one must not forget that the necessity for more differentiation 
essentially originates from the need for intensified community action 
in many EU policy areas. A very recent example is the overall 
acknowledged need for intensified and improved action in the 
economic and monetary policy area, which has become apparent due 
to the global financial crisis. The notion of differentiation comes into 
the picture when determining that more community action does not 
                                                                                                                                 
 
46 The successful implementation of the Treaty of Prüm into the Union framework, 
which was an extra-Union cooperation initially, would prove that the chances to 
incorporate a legal and political acquis into the EU framework are higher if the 
participating states keep the ‘outs’ constantly informed and if initially participating 
EU states actively promote a quick incorporation. 
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always mean more concerted action by all 27. To build further on the 
above example, stronger concerted action in the economic and 
monetary area makes more sense among the countries of the euro 
zone. This should not mean the absolute exclusion of the others, which 
is guaranteed, for example, through the representation of all states in 
the Ecofin Council, which remains the decision-taking body where all 
countries have their say. But meetings of euro zone representatives, 
even heads of states and government, are nevertheless a useful tool in 
order to tackle problems that demand more cooperation. 
In this respect, one could wonder why the French proposal on an 
‘economic government’ of the euro group47 (compare Strassel 2009 
for more information) has been met with such harsh criticism if it 
makes sense to have more cooperation in this area. The problem here 
was the approach chosen by the French in order to get their proposal 
passed. They applied yet another means of differentiation, 
conceptually linked to the concept of an avant-garde EU – the 
application of active leadership. President Sarkozy proposed in a 
speech in the EP on 21 October 2008 (Agence Europe 2008) regular 
meetings of the heads of states and government of the euro group by 
establishing a new, formal forum in order to better coordinate 
responses to the global financial crisis. This would serve as a unified 
economic government of the euro zone led by President Sarkozy 
himself beyond the Presidency of his country48. There was no other 
way that this was perceived as an attempt to undermine the following 
Czech Presidency in particular and drawing a line between 
big/important/skilful and small/new/inexperienced EU member states 
in general. This proposal sparked a heated debate about alleged French 
attempts to categorise countries according to their ability to lead the 
EU appropriately, in doing so “sending the message of a hierarchy of 
important and less important countries” (Neuman 2008). In short, the 
approach chosen by the French sparked suspicions about the 
establishment of an avant-garde or upper class EU with the French on 
top and especially with ‘newer’ and smaller member states being less 
important and therefore left behind. Although the French proposal of 
more concerted action among the euro zone countries might have in its 
substance been the correct answer to the crisis, the approach chosen to 
implement this by establishing a formal forum to the blunt exclusion 
of others led to the outright refusal of the proposed plan, even by 
                                                                                                                                 
 
47 This idea has been supported by Spain (Phillips 2009). 
48 President Sarkozy seemed to see himself presiding over this hypothetical group 
until 2010 in a bid to offer a stronger command than that which could be offered by 
the successive six-month EU presidencies of the eurosceptic and struggling Czech 
government and the Swedes, who remain outside the euro zone. Then, in 2010, Spain 
would be able to take over from President Sarkozy, combining the two roles of EU 
and euro zone president (EurActiv.com 2008). 
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countries that would have been included in the new forum, most 
notably Germany. 
This example shows that despite all the advantages linked to 
differentiation within the Union, in some cases it is inevitable that 
stepping out of the framework must be allowed. Its most useful 
application is if outside, or informal, differentiation is used to make 
concerted action possible within the Union, as preparatory work for 
concerted action. Inside, or formal, differentiation in this context is 
sometimes not feasible as it contains the momentum of an avant-garde 
EU, or raises suspicions about a country aspiring leadership. The 
lesson to learn is, consequently, that in certain contexts differentiation 
strategies can only be successful if adopted informally, that is outside 
the Union framework. This can be illustrated by another example 
where informality was applied and therefore good results could be 
achieved. 
The common position of the European Council on 16/17 October 
2008 in preparation for the World Finance summit in Washington on 
15 November 2008 was based on an action plan designed by the 
finance ministers of the euro group with significant influence from a 
non-euro country (Great Britain) and was adopted by the 11 remaining 
member states (Dyson & Marcussen 2009, 22). This means that 
concerted action of the EU-27 was preceded by action of only a group 
of member states but was nevertheless accepted by all 27. How was 
this possible? 
The euro group has the character of a loose, informal cooperation 
forum in which the finance ministers of the euro group meet regularly 
in order to coordinate their action concerning the euro ahead of Ecofin 
meetings.49 The euro countries plus the UK saw it as a necessity to 
react quickly and decidedly to the current crisis situation and therefore 
decided to meet outside the formal Ecofin framework in order to flesh 
out an action plan for the whole EU. That their approach was 
successful was significantly determined by the factor informality. It 
allowed not only the inclusion of the non-euro country UK into the 
group, but most crucially was its quality that the remaining non-euro 
countries accepted the exclusiveness of the meeting of the group. The 
formal floor remains Ecofin where all 27 member states have their 
say. If formality had been transferred to the group meeting, the 
excluded countries would not have accepted this move, although 
content-wise the outcome can expected to be the same as in the 
informal meeting. Additionally, one could apply Emmanouilidis’ 
                                                                                                                                 
 
49 Protocol No 14 on the Euro Group of the Treaty on the European Union 
(consolidated version Lisbon Treaty), Art. 1: The Ministers of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro shall meet informally. Such meetings shall take place, 
when necessary, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities they 
share with regard to the single currency. 
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concept of intergovernmental cooperation outside the Union 
framework in the form of Loose Coalitions, according to which 
intergovernmental cooperation is established to fulfil a single task or 
purpose (Emmanouilidis 2008, 25 f.). The meeting between euro 
countries plus the UK can be interpreted as such an ad hoc 
cooperation. In sum, the necessity of quick and rapid action in 
response to the crisis situation made a group of member states 
cooperate more deeply to the exclusion of the others. For this to be 
accepted by all 27 member states and eventually to allow concerted 
action by the whole EU, the condition of informality of the group had 
to be fulfilled. In conclusion, the informal Ecofin-euro-Council 
formation could be interpreted as a de facto institutionalisation 
without actual formalisation in the sense of the “living constitution of 
the EU” (Marcussen 2008). 
This nice picture of applying flexibility outside the Union 
framework with the consent of all players has to be confronted with a 
number of potential flaws. First of all, countries have the possibility to 
reject or obstruct group formations within the Union framework. 
Naturally, they do not have this means if some countries chose to 
cooperate more closely outside the framework, precisely for the fact 
that it happens outside the framework – a location where every 
sovereign country can pursue politics of alliances as much as it wants. 
Therefore, differentiation outside the Union framework is unbound 
and not a matter to be decided by other EU countries. Secondly, the 
prior make-up of a policy proposal – like the action plan in response to 
the financial crisis – by a group of member states can potentially put 
the excluded countries under pressure to accept the proposal for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, there is the time-aspect which is related to 
the political context of the proposal. In times of crises it is important 
to react quickly. Secondly, if the countries consider rejecting the 
proposal – be it on the grounds that they have been excluded from the 
deliberations or because they reject the content – they are under 
pressure to present an alternative plan. This again leads – especially 
for the smaller countries – to the problem of having the appropriate 
capacity to present an own proposal as quickly as possible. 
Nevertheless, the non-bureaucratic approach taken by the euro 
countries plus the UK can be viewed as a precedence of a new kind of 
policy making, especially in areas where rapid political reaction is 
crucial. Therefore, this behaviour is likely to be more common in the 
future. 
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8 The Role of the Respective 
Policy Area 
After having thoroughly elaborated on different embodiments of 
differentiation, the respective policy areas in which those 
embodiments are applied have to be analysed. The policy area is a 
crucial factor in determining if the chosen differentiation approach has 
unifying rather than disruptive effects on the European integration 
project. Peter-Christian Müller-Graff proposes the thesis that a 
differentiation measure has a unifying integration tendency the more it 
serves the functioning of the single market and/or the less it runs 
counter to specific national political interests (2007, 134). It has to be 
added to the latter point that integrationist leaps of countries against 
their specific national interests do nevertheless take place. This could 
be explained by a process of national trade-off considerations between 
economic and political and/or strategic objectives. One example is that 
the new member states are willing to implement sometimes painful 
economic and structural reforms as they receive political and strategic 
shelter in the EU solidarity community in return. Another could be 
that countries are afraid of being left behind in the integration process 
and are therefore willing to make compromises to the detriment of 
specific national interests. 
Returning to the former point, the main reason for choosing the 
single market as the reference point is the economic principle of 
comparative advantages. This means that in the context of the 
integration process, economic interconnectedness through a common 
market generates needs for intensified cooperation in policy areas 
close to the single market (Müller-Graff 2007, 134). Accordingly, a 
classification of policy areas into those necessary for, not essential to 
but feasibly for and, rather remote from the functioning of the single 
market can be suggested (based on ibid., 134-137)50: 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
50 In the German original those three concepts are named “binnenmarktzwingende”, 
“binnenmarktplausible” and “binnenmarktferne Fälle”. 
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Necessary policy areas Feasible policy areas Remote policy areas 
Free movement of people 
Schengen agreement + 
security aspects: aviation 
security, passport/visa 
system 
Monetary Union 
monetary law is a crucial 
component of national 
sovereignty, therefore 
potential for dissociation 
tendencies 
Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
Iraq mission as example 
for disunity; competing 
differentiating alliances 
could have a unifying 
shock effect leading to 
more concerted foreign 
policy cooperation, e.g. as 
a rebound effect for the 
pro-war-group after a 
failed joint adventure 
(“Iraq syndrome”) (Bailes 
2009, 9); but also 
continued disruptive 
effects possible 
The Treaty of Prüm 
regulation of the exchange 
of DNA data between EU 
countries to fight crime 
Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal 
Matters 
 
External perception of 
the single market concept 
effect on other 
European/non-EU 
countries, ‘force of 
attraction’ on EFTA 
countries, “autonomous 
follow-up“ 
Energy cooperation  
Social policy 
for example Maastricht 
Social Policy Protocol 
  
 
The classification in this table illustrates that, concerning the single 
market, the assumption holds that harmonisation of national 
regulations is the agreed aim of the actors as this is necessary a 
condition for a single market to function, for example to deter ‘free 
riding’ (Dyson & Marcussen 2009, 4). In other words, it is justified to 
say that in connection to the single market unitary integration is the 
pursued goal as it ensures the very success of the policy. However, 
this cannot be said about external policy areas of the EU, like foreign, 
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security and defence policy.51 Therefore, it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between internal and external EU policies.52 
The creation and further development of the single market has let 
to a huge amount of harmonisation, standardisation and regulation of 
national policies, for example, to allow equal market access for people 
and goods with the four freedoms, to protect individual freedoms and 
rights with a common labour legislation, or to create a single bloc vis-
à-vis outsiders, for instance in WTO negotiations. What is not 
standardised or unified is either a case of subsidiarity, justified 
through ‘legitimate variation’, for example because of deep-rooted 
national traditions, or there are gains to be made from being diverse 
(Bailes 2008) through burden sharing, comparative advantages, 
specialisation and division of labour. Whereas a huge amount of 
harmonisation can thus be identified in internal policy areas of the EU, 
one has to ascertain very strong diversities between the member states 
in external policies. However, this is not to neglect the fact that 
consistency in some basic principles53 and signs of a common 
European external action outlook together with set forms of action 
exist, as it is often crucial to show a ‘common front’ to have a 
collective impact in world politics. For example, there is an increasing 
awareness of new and common non-military threats in the post-Cold 
War era54 (Bailes 2009, 11). More concrete, common positions or 
actions are usually adapted in order to have an influence on ‘global 
governance’ to pursue – if reachable – common European interests, 
for example in form of having a strong voice vis-à-vis other actors in 
international organisations. Common action is also pursued where 
only indirect European interests are identifiable, for example the 
policy of ‘helping for the sake of helping’ or ‘helping for the 
improvement of the international system’, such as in the area of 
                                                                                                                                 
 
51 The most apparent example is that Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein have only 
joined the single market sphere of the EU through the EEA agreement. 
Consequently, they have only accepted to pursue economic harmonisation. However, 
the opinions about the level of harmonisation in policy areas beyond the single 
market vary also greatly between EU member states. 
52 This distinction constitutes the two ‘extreme’ cases: the single market on the 
harmonisation end and foreign policy/security/defence policy on the diversity end. It 
has to be left to further research to also include policy areas that are halfway between 
those two. One example is the area of internal security, for example the Schengen 
system or the Treaty of Prüm, which combines foreign policy and single market 
issues. Another example is energy policy, which has significant external qualities, 
for example relations to Russia, and internal aspects, for example a single market for 
energy. 
53 This comprises common legal positions of EU countries, for example on arms 
control issues, the death penalty, UN membership or development aid. 
54 However, although Europeans seem to be less distinctive in the kinds of threats 
they perceive, they nevertheless differ more dramatically in the level of their 
agreement over how to handle those challenges (Bailes 2009, 11). 
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development aid and poverty reduction in developing countries (“do-
gooding missions” (Bailes 2009, 5)). ‘Indirect’ interests in this sense 
mean that the necessity of the concerted action could be hard to 
explain to European citizens (Bailes 2008). Without neglecting the 
factual existence of common external action of the EU, as just 
described, nevertheless, one cannot deny the predominance of 
diverging national interests when it comes to foreign policy making of 
the countries of the European Union. This is institutionalised by the 
necessity of consensus in the decision-making process of this area of 
highly politically sensitive issues. This rule has an effective meaning 
as external actors would play on divisions within the EU when, let’s 
say, five EU members get overruled by QMV (interview Alyson 
Bailes). 
The following tables (drawn from Bailes 2008 and Bailes 2009, 8-
11) give an overview of the factors causing the differences between 
EU countries concerning external policy-making. 
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All these drivers for difference help to explain why much of the EU’s 
foreign, security and defence output still comes from nation-states and 
therefore, is not ‘supranationalised’ (Bailes 2009, 11 f.) on the 
European level. This leads in its conclusion to the existence of a pre-
eminent disunity between EU member states concerning external 
policy actions. 
Having outlined the existence of fundamental differences between 
EU member states when it comes to external policy-making, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
55 Examples for different threat perceptions: ”Opinion polls regularly show higher 
German than Spanish levels of concern about Russia and energy dependence – 
which do not contradict but rather explain Germany’s preference for handling 
Moscow with kid gloves. The British worry more than the Nordics about terrorism 
and nuclear rivalry, and Italians more than the British about the Mafia, while 
Nordics are more exposed to and concerned about the environment, and so on.” 
(Bailes 2009, 9) 
Primary Factors 
- History: old/new state, big/small state, extra-European empire or not, 
possessing ‘war guilt’ or occupiers’ guilt or not, experience of revolutions 
- Geography: edge or middle of Europe, ‘exposed’ situation, ‘Continental’ 
power, ‘Maritime’ (‘global’) power, respective neighbours therefore 
different political, economic and ecological threat exposures55 or differing 
feelings associated with the degree of multi-ethnicity and experience of 
immigration within a society 
- Economy: economic profile concerning market system, energy 
(inter)dependency, trade advantages and competitiveness 
- Ethnic profile: role of minorities (old/new, positively/negatively perceived) 
Secondary Factors 
= filter for primary factors, how they appear/how ‘intense’ 
- General governance system: including non-state powers (e.g. banks, 
churches), role of public opinion 
- Defence and security governance: variation in European national defence 
and security ‘cultures’, variation concerning the necessary resources 
Tertiary Factors 
- Outside influences: other states, institutions 
o most influential for smaller states, gearing towards bigger states 
o institutional preferences of countries to handle political issues 
o differing obligations to non-EU actors and institutions when it 
comes to external crises (Bailes 2009b, 6) 
  49 
respective effects of that on European integration have to be analysed. 
Externally, diverging national interests are 
(a) helpful if going further in the same direction 
(b) neutral if outside the EU range of competence or ambition, 
or 
(c) harmful if cutting across existing or emergent common 
policies. 
One can ascertain that category (b) is steadily shrinking, implying that 
in the area of foreign policy the EU is more and more forced to take 
joint positions if it does not want to be perceived as a weak player in 
the international area, a good example being the Iraq War of 2003. 
Hence, there is more pressure to reach a consensus in this area, as 
unanimity will remain the rule in the traditional second pillar because 
it is not feasible to overrule countries in such a highly sensitive policy 
field. Consequently, the EU has to move into new areas of common 
policies besides the single market, and this does not only comprise 
classical foreign policy issues, but also related areas like 
environmental or energy policy.56 With initiatives like the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Strategy the EU has already reacted to this development (Bailes 2008). 
As unanimity is the prevailing norm in the area of foreign, security 
and defence policy, diversity and with it differentiation appears to 
have rather harmful effects on the European integration process57, for 
example, in form of a ‘broken common front’ or inconsistent 
behaviour on principled issues. The limited effects of constructive 
abstention, the fact that the application of enhanced cooperation in 
CFSP requires a unanimous decision within the Council, and the fact 
that the major innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the field 
of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – permanent 
structured cooperation – “merely” focuses on the improvement of 
military capabilities, guarantee that the strategic orientation of 
CFSP/CSDP requires the unanimous support of all member states. 
This demonstrates the rather limited scope of differentiation within 
CFSP mirroring the widespread awareness that the success of the 
EU’s foreign, security and defence policy requires a high level of 
internal cohesion and unity (Emmanouilidis 2008, 22). The expected 
effect is that countries relocate policy issues outside the Union 
                                                                                                                                 
 
56 Furthermore, the interconnectedness of internal and external policy areas has to be 
kept in mind, for example security being related to energy, climate change and 
development policy to environmental and economic policy. Additionally, single 
policy areas can unite internal and external policy aspects within them, for example 
the interconnectedness of internal and external security governance. 
57 However, diversity can of course also have useful implications in external policy-
making, for example through different strengths or specialisations of countries (niche 
roles) if this is coordinated in form of a harmonious interplay of diversities, 
especially also towards other actors. 
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framework in order to ‘escape’ the unanimity rule (politics of 
alliances). The problem in this connection is that different views 
concerning external policies can be perceived as rather diametrically 
opposed than in the area of internal policies. Again the Iraq war is an 
example, countries were either ‘in favour of’ or ‘opposed to’ joining 
the war. In other words, a middle course or a compromise is usually 
harder to find than in internal policies. 
The reason for the EU being a weak actor if it does not speak 
externally with one voice is that the Union’s influence is dependent on 
perceptions from other countries. A good example is an extract from 
last year’s global trends review of the US National Intelligence 
Council (NIC): 
 
This year's [2008] report, Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed, foresees 
the EU in 2025 as likely having completed its institutional reforms and 
consolidated itself as a political entity, but infighting between member states 
with competing domestic interests and a European public alienated by a 
perceived democratic deficit will leave it a "hobbled giant", with massive 
economic heft but little genuine international power. (Phillips 2008) 
 
Against this background, it seems feasible to assume that the pressure 
for the EU to speak to the rest of the world with a single voice will 
become more and more intense. Some even call the refusal to make 
collective EU choices in the world of 2025 “tantamount to an 
abdication of sovereignty” (Howorth et al 2007, 22.). In this context, 
enlargement, complexity and ‘the logic of diversity’ must be 
perceived as the main obstacles to this necessity to create a unified 
and integrated EU. The sharp normative disagreements among the 
citizens of Europe regarding the desirability of such an integrated EU 
complicate the picture even more. This prevailing diversity leads to 
the fact that it is increasingly easy for other actors to play on the 
internal divisions within the EU (Hill & Smith 2005, 406; for an 
example see Fox & Godement 2009 on EU-China relations). 
In the light of this situation, one possible remedy would be to 
extend the aquis of the Union by broadening the scope of CFSP so 
that it is less possible for countries to ‘escape’ the common 
framework. However, as outlined above, strict EU regulation is only 
accepted in non-sensitive areas where countries can agree easily, for 
example the condemnation of capital punishment or torture. 
Equalisation in other areas is not possible or even sensible, because of 
prevailing differences between the actors (interview Alyson Bailes). In 
the light of this, it is necessary to change the integration logic of the 
European integration process concerning the EU’s external and 
therewith global role. As it is increasingly impossible for the EU to 
speak with one voice, although it is more and more forced to do so in 
order to be influential, the whole logic has to be changed. In other 
words, the EU has to change the perception that non-concerted action 
is synonymous with weakness. More precisely, first of all, the EU 
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itself has to accept the fact that it cannot be united on every issue at all 
times. If it is then able to transport this message to the outside that 
flexibility and diversity are necessary and natural features of the EU 
on its way to a more and more concerted foreign policy capability, 
then it is not going to be perceived as a weak actor. It is firstly about 
defining itself and its role internally, then framing the outside role 
accordingly. The overall end of more and more concerted foreign 
policy action should prevail; it is again rather about process than 
outcome differentiation. In order to succeed in this, the initial effort is 
the responsibility of every single EU country to cope with the 
specialities linked to foreign policy. Being a core issue of national 
sovereignty and an area that is potentially compromise-averse, 
outright disagreements, diametrical oppositions and even mutual 
accusations of pursuing the wrong policies can and will occur. 
Naturally, such situations do not help to strengthen the Union’s role 
abroad, no matter how acknowledged a differentiated integration 
process is. It is therefore in the hands of the member states, if not to 
find compromises, at least avoid politically ‘attacking’ one another 
and always striving for at least acceptance or respect for other 
countries’ policy approaches for the sake of a ‘good picture’ of the 
Union abroad. This strive for compromise and mutual respect at home 
paired with an understanding of the European integration process as 
being differentiated in its process dimensions abroad, could help to 
solve the dilemma of having to speak with one single voice in a Union 
with increasingly diverse interests. 
In general, it is crucial for the Union to emphasise more the 
advantages than the disadvantages of differentiation. Additionally, 
European actors should praise individual countries more for their 
individual inputs and it should be more about recognising what the EU 
achieves instead of what it does not achieve. The Union’s reaction to 
the war in Georgia in August 2008, its climate change agenda, or its 
reaction to the recent economic developments are all examples where 
no grave misguidance or malpractice by the Union is apparent. In 
simple words, things do go right in EU policy-making and it should be 
communicated more strongly towards the Union’s own people and 
external actors. (interview Alyson Bailes) 
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9 The Relationship between the 
Union and its Citizens in a 
Differentiated Integration Process 
Diversity is no obstacle to European integration and therefore there is 
no need to demonise it. Deriving from the Union’s motto ‘Unity in 
Diversity’, divergence is a normal state of affairs in the European 
Union. Even more, diversity – or pluralism – is a prerequisite of 
modernity as only highly diversified societies are able to succeed in 
the conditions of modern competition. The problem facing a 
supranational integration project like the EU that defines itself as a 
‘Union of the citizens’ is that cultural identity and democracy require 
transparency, simplicity and a sense of belonging to a defined 
community (Zielonka 2000, 161). This is definitely hard to acquire in 
a highly diversified environment like the European Union with its 
potentially 27+ member states. 
This problem has been touched upon by Emmanouilidis in his 
most recent work on differentiation where he suggests the elaboration 
of a “narrative of differentiated integration” is necessary in order to 
“explain to the wider European public in a comprehensible fashion the 
purpose and reasoning behind flexible integration”. In order to achieve 
the required overview and transparency of flexibility in the interaction 
process, which is needed in order to succeed in this endeavour, 
Emmanouilidis further proposes the setting up of an “informal 
differentiation board”, including the Commission and elected 
representatives of the states participating in the various differentiation 
projects, who should coordinate the activities of the various 
differentiation projects inside and outside the EU framework 
(Emmanouilidis 2008, 11, 60 f.). 
Given today’s already often-lamented communication deficit 
between the Union and its citizens58, a huge effort is necessary in 
order to succeed in explaining a differentiated integration process to 
the people. One “window of explanation opportunity” could be that 
                                                                                                                                 
 
58 For many: Laumen, Maurer (2006, 27) talk about the duty of the member states to 
change their communicative approach towards their citizens on EU matters. They 
especially lament the “EU-schizophrenia” of many member states, which means ‘to 
agree in Brussels, but fighting it at home’ (in the German original: “in Brüssel 
mitstimmen, zu Hause dagegen anschreien”). 
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the narrative should focus on the democratic potential of differentiated 
integration means59 and the fact that better results can be expected for 
the people through the application of various forms of differentiation. 
As already stated, in connection to the EU’s citizens and external 
actors, process differentiation should be communicated as a natural 
feature of the integration process and not as a weakness of the Union. 
One could argue that such an approach does not make the EU’s 
citizens understand the political procedure. This is correct! However, 
given the high complexity of an institutional and decision-making 
entity like the EU complicated by flexibility mechanisms, legitimate 
doubts can be raised on whether this is an achievable aim, despite how 
desirable and helpful it would be. For this reason, the communication 
of the possibility to achieve better results through differentiation is an 
approach focusing on output legitimacy60. This is not to neglect that 
there is also still a lot to do on the side of input legitimacy, through a 
broader involvement of the EP and national parliaments in the 
decision-making and –taking process of the EU for example. As 
Heinrich August Winkler puts it, as member states are still the Masters 
of the Treaties, their national parliaments have to take on more 
European responsibility. If they succeed to be heard before crucial 
decisions are taken – for example on the granting of candidate status 
to an aspirant country or on the inception of accession negotiations – 
they can prevent such decisions being taken behind closed doors to 
later be presented to the public as fait accompli (Winkler 2009, 290). 
Such measures are necessary in order to enhance citizens’ trust in the 
Union’s institutions and, therewith, also the acceptance of a 
differentiated integration process. 
Another viewpoint concerning the communication problem 
between the EU and its citizens is possible. One could argue that large 
parts of the EU’s citizens think already that differentiation is a good 
thing but the problem is that the EU is perceived as an enemy of 
diversity (interview Alyson Bailes). The question then is not how to 
make the people like differentiation, but how to make them understand 
that the EU supports diversity and honours the individual countries for 
their individual input. On the other hand, there are areas, 
predominantly in the external sphere, where citizens want more 
uniformity, for example, from a tax point of view when moving from 
one country to another or concerning protection abroad from 
                                                                                                                                 
 
59 Compare the above paragraph on opt-out policy. 
60 The dilemma between policy efficiency and legitimacy through people’s 
involvement, thoroughly outlined by Dahl (1994), can be seen as connected to the 
situation described here. Dahl writes: “[T]he two that compose the dilemma under 
discussion here are the ability of the citizens to exercise democratic control over the 
decisions of the polity versus the capacity of the system to respond satisfactorily to 
the collective preferences of its citizens.” (1994, 28) 
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whichever EU embassy. In this sense, the crucial point concerning the 
relationship between the EU and its citizens concerning differentiation 
in the external policy area is that the EU is not honouring diversity 
enough where the citizens want it and the EU does not harmonise 
policies where citizens would like to see it. 
To conclude, concerning the messages the Union should send in 
order to correct the picture concerning process differentiation and 
outcome harmonisation in the European integration process, the 
following simple information should get through: 
 
Necessary message towards the outside world: 
We can be a Union despite being diverse! 
 
Necessary message towards European citizens: 
We can be diverse despite being a Union! 
 
9.1 An ”EU of Projects” in a ”Multi-way 
Integration Process” 
The notion of an “EU of Projects” can be considered as a possible way 
of reconciling the dilemma between increasing process differentiation 
in the European integration process and improving the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens. It has to be understood as being 
embedded in a “multi-way integration process” that takes into account 
the necessity and factual existence of process differentiation in the 
European integration project. In times of a “triple crisis” as outlined 
above – financial, economic and constitutional – new lines of 
reasoning for the necessity of a European integration project have to 
be communicated to the people in order to secure necessary popular 
support. The experience of war was a sufficient legitimation basis at 
the beginning of the integration process – the peace community 
argument – but is no longer today, especially for the younger 
generation (Laumen, Maurer 2006, 28). In other words, people have to 
be given the opportunity to identify with the European process to 
ensure the legitimacy of the European project. One means to this is a 
stronger focus on the approach of an “EU of Projects”. 
Projects are a good means to get closer to the people. It is argued 
that people can more easily identify with concrete political projects 
than with treaty reform. This has become more prevalent due to recent 
cumulative treaty reform attempts in form of the failed Constitutional 
Treaty and the current difficulties with the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, leading to ‘treaty fatigue’ among the citizens. Two 
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conclusions have to be draw from this current status. Firstly, 
institutional reform is needed although people have difficulties 
identifying with this process. Even more, up-to-date treaties are a 
prerequisite in order for the EU to be able to initiate and successfully 
accomplish projects. Secondly, no obvious big project seems to be in 
the air today despite the triple crisis Europe is faced with. It is 
doubtful that new issues like democracy enhancement in the EU or 
climate change challenges are big enough to create huge momentum 
like the projects of a European single market and a common European 
currency were able to do. An undoubted big event or project was the 
big enlargement round of 2004, and the Lisbon Treaty can argued to 
be the logical institutional consequence of this project. The problem 
is, however, that enlargement has already happened without the new 
treaty being in force. Therefore the link is not that strong. 
Furthermore, for the EU-15 enlargement is something that does not 
happen at home, rather “abroad” and is therefore not directly 
perceived as an added value, sometimes even as a burden. 
One also has to state that the EU has already a very good record on 
actually established projects. There is a lot the 27 member states have 
agreed on despite lingering veto rights. However, a “permissive 
consensus”61 in the European integration process no longer exists 
today. Rather, the EU’s citizens increasingly seem to have strong 
opinions about the cost-benefit-evaluation of European integration, 
which turns out to be increasingly negative (Laumen, Maurer 2006, 
24). Politicians become hesitant European actors because of the 
peoples’ discontent and ‘fatigue’ with the EU; increased national 
rhetoric leads to enforced renationalisation tendencies on the citizen as 
well as on the elite level. National politicians become less willing to 
transfer competencies to the EU, as they see no point in further 
integration given the peoples’ dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in 
European integration. This again leads to people steering their focus 
even less on the European level, creating a vicious circle towards 
more and more inward-looking European countries, damaging the 
legitimacy of the European integration project. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
61 This model is taken from Lindberg and Scheingold (1997) who analysed the 
attitude of EU citizens during the 40ies and 60ies and who found out that people’s 
attitude have hardly determined or influenced the development of the European 
integration process. In other words, they gave plenty of rope to the actors of the 
integration policy. This ‘tacit agreement’ to the course of the integration process was 
possible as no overt controversies were available at that time and therefore the 
political elite communicated no opposition to the process. Consequently, a growing 
majority of the EU’s citizens were convinced about the desirability and 
profitableness of European integration. This ‘permissive consensus’ was also 
supported by economic progress and increasing prosperity as well as the security- 
and peace-enhancing effect of European integration (Laumen, Maurer 2006, 5). 
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This very bleak picture of the relationship between the elites and 
the citizens can be brightened up to a certain extent. First of all, 
institutional reform and projects for the good of Europe’s citizens 
have to be communicated as two sides of the same coin. When people 
primarily understand treaty reform in terms of costs, mainly in the 
form of greater transfer of sovereignty from the nation state to the 
European level, those costs have to be communicated as a necessary 
investment in order to receive the pay-off. Such pay-offs are the 
capability of the EU to implement policy projects to serve the interest 
of the EU’s citizens. Secondly, although events like the financial, 
economic and constitutional crisis of the EU enforce renationalisation 
tendencies for example in form of “economic nationalism” (Mahony 
2009b), events can also trigger growing demand for common 
European problem solving mechanisms, for example, environmental 
and especially climate change challenges. In other words, there are 
definitely not only renationalisation tendencies in the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens. However, to ensure the necessary 
popular support for its projects the EU has to work on the 
communication of its capabilities. This does not only mean resorting 
to the advantages of common European policy making in terms of 
output (output legitimacy), but also finding ways to involve the 
people, making those affected feel able to affect the European 
integration process (input legitimacy). 
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10 Conclusion 
As desirable as process differentiation on a temporary basis with the 
explicit aim of encompassing all member states as soon as possible 
might be, the likelihood of permanent closer cooperations inside, as 
well as outside the Union framework will remain. Therefore, it is 
tempting to assume that the European integration process is 
developing towards a fragmented Union, characterised by permanent 
avant-garde groups. But such an interpretation would again mean 
focusing on the intended outcome of the European integration project, 
which is not the path to follow. Rather, the character of the European 
integration process being open-ended should be kept in mind. Then 
the intention or purpose of the integration process moves into the 
centre of attention, which is to benefit the European people through an 
economic and increasingly political Union of European countries. 
Against this background, permanent closer cooperations between 
member states lose most of their threatening potential, which only 
becomes prevalent in the debate about the final outcome of the 
integration project. Therefore, as long as better results in an enlarged 
and increasingly diverse Union with 27+ member states can be 
achieved with the help of differentiation instruments, permanent closer 
cooperations in- or outside the Union framework should not be 
regarded as tremendously threatening the whole European project. 
Also, the success of temporarily enhanced cooperation or alliances 
policies in the sense that they lead to overall integration of all member 
states will keep the ideal of a harmonisation project alive. In order to 
achieve this, the reputation of process differentiation has to be 
adjusted in the sense that European citizens and external actors 
perceive it as a normal and natural feature of the integration project. 
To achieve this, the member states and the European Commission 
have to take steps to allow enhanced cooperation to become a 
practiced and effective integration tool of the same value as traditional 
integration means. 
 
  58 
11 Recommendations for Further 
Research 
Given the extensive scope of the issue under study it is definitely not 
possible to cover all interesting aspects linked to differentiation in the 
European integration process. Therefore this section outlines some of 
the research areas where the author sees a need for further academic 
effort. 
One area that should be elaborated on more thoroughly is the 
notion that overall-integration ideas are only valid or sustainable for 
an EU ‘in fair-weather conditions’. Put differently, one could argue 
that there is a fundamental weakness of European integration and 
cooperation ideals in times of unexpected events and crises. This topic 
has gained relevance particularly due to the outbreak of the financial 
and economic crises in autumn 2008. One could analyse the amount 
and type of differentiated means in the European integration process 
along a continuum routine vs. crisis. A hypothesis would be that 
European actors are more prone to act in harmony in routine situation 
and when the policy issue at hand is characterised by positive 
conjunctures, whereas in times of crisis and unintended or extreme 
situations more differentiated behaviour could be expected. One could 
then conclude that harmonious approaches developed in political ‘fair 
weather conditions’ are not sustainable in times of crises. Moreover, 
one could analyse inasmuch political statements emphasising the 
importance of unity especially in times of crisis can be declared as 
mere lip service or if accordant action is taken to keep the European 
unity. Finally, one could discuss whether certain crises situations 
simply go beyond the means or capacity of the European Union to 
handle them appropriately. In terms of the financial and economic 
crisis one could maintain that the amounts of money that are needed to 
support a leading retail bank are beyond the means of the EU. The 
political crisis that would be created by such a failure is too great a 
threat for a national politician to survive (European Voice, 2008). 
Appropriate case studies might include the 2003 Iraq war and the 
financial and economic crisis, which started at the end of 2008. As this 
crisis situation is still very new and ongoing, research concerning the 
crisis and its effect on the European integration process should be 
conducted with some temporal distance.  
Given the period of institutional and political change the EU finds 
itself in at the moment – constitutional reform, enlargement, financial 
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and economic crisis – the author feels that further research on the 
notion of an ‘EU of Projects’ is needed. Again here it seems worth 
waiting until the Union has gotten itself into calmer waters again. Also 
the further development of the area of environmental policy in 
general, and climate change in particular, in light of the upcoming 
decision on a post-Kyoto framework in December 2009 in 
Copenhagen, is expected to deliver new material for an assessment if 
environmental policies could perform a new big project of the 
European Union its people can better identify with. 
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12 Executive Summary 
This study departs from the normative assumption that differentiation 
understood in process terms is a normal state of affairs in the 
European integration process. This is increasingly true due to the 
cumulative amount of policy areas that are handled on the European 
level, the increasing amount of member states of the Union as well as 
due to the challenges the EU faces nowadays in terms of financial, 
economic, and constitutional crises. By establishing the difference 
between process and outcome differentiation, the author emphasises 
the need for understanding the project of the EU as open-ended, 
therewith marking the discussions about the end-state of the Union as 
redundant and leading to nowhere in the endeavour to understand and 
analyse the European integration process. The focus of this thesis is 
therefore on the analysis of process differentiation in the European 
integration project. Outcome differentiation is not in focus as the 
overall ideal of the EU, which is to achieve and preserve a 
homogenous integration of the member states of the European Union, 
is still the unanimously pursued goal of the member states and the 
institutions of the EU. 
Having a normative constructive approach as the theoretical 
basement of this study, the author evaluates four different 
embodiments of differentiation means in- and outside the Union 
framework according to their usefulness and integration-friendliness 
in the integration process. Those comprise the concepts of different 
speeds, avant-garde EU, opt-out policy and politics of alliances. The 
author outlines the possibilities and strengths as well as the risks and 
weaknesses of those differentiation means. A further primary aim is to 
achieve as much terminological clarity as possible concerning the 
different embodiments, as the debate on differentiation has been 
characterised by a rather inflationary usage and interpretation of terms 
and concepts. In conclusion, differentiated integration inside the 
Union framework as a temporary flexibility mechanism with the 
explicit aim to include all member states as soon as possible is 
evaluated as the most community-friendly flexibility approach. 
However, the author acknowledges that permanent differentiation 
inside as well as outside the Union framework has, does, and will take 
place, mainly in the area of foreign, security and defence policy due to 
persisting major differences concerning political interests of the 
member states. 
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Subsequently, the importance of the respective policy area in 
which differentiation means are applied is outlined. The respective 
policy area is a crucial factor in determining if the chosen 
differentiation approach has unifying or rather disruptive effects on 
the European integration project. The author draws a distinction 
between internal and external EU policies, analysing the single market 
and the area of foreign, security and defence policies according to the 
implications of differentiation in those areas. The author sees these 
two policy areas as rather ‘extreme’ cases because concerning the 
single market the assumption holds that the goal of harmonisation of 
national regulations is the agreed aim of the actors, as this is the 
necessary condition for a single market to function. In contrast, the 
area of foreign, security and defence policy is characterised by strong 
diversities between the member states and therefore flexibility means 
are used very frequently. Those diversities are explained by referring 
to factors such as history, geography and general governance system. 
The problem concerning differentiation in EU external policy 
making is that the EU’s success on the international stage is dependent 
on how it is perceived by other players. Not speaking with one voice 
in international politics is generally perceived as a weakness of the 
Union. Therefore, as unanimity is the prevailing norm in the area of 
external policy-making, diversity, and with it differentiation, appear to 
have rather harmful effects on the European integration process. 
Given the increasing amount of external policy issues the EU is faced 
with, one can come to the conclusion that the pressure for the EU to 
speak to the rest of the world with a single voice will become more 
and more intense. This causes the dilemma for the EU of being under 
increasing pressure to speak to the rest of the world with one voice, 
while at the same time being confronted with the increasing diversity 
of external policy interests within the Union leading to rather 
differentiated policy approaches instead of a harmonised approach 
comprising all member states. 
In a next step, the thesis expounds the problem of the relationship 
between the Union and its citizens in a differentiated integration 
process. Given the rather distant relationship between the Union and 
its people, differentiation can be expected to add another layer of 
complexity and therefore to deepen the rift. The author recommends 
working on the communication deficit by focussing on output 
legitimacy, which is to emphasise the democratic potential of 
differentiated integration means and the fact that better results can be 
expected for the people through the application of various forms of 
differentiation. Furthermore, it is crucial for the EU to strike a balance 
between harmonisation and diversity according to the peoples’ wishes. 
In other words, the Union should on the one hand support and 
acknowledge diversity as something good and useful where people 
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would like to see it and, on the other, it should promote harmonisation 
where people feel that it is still lacking. 
The author puts forward the concept of an “EU of Projects” in a 
“multi-way integration process” as a means to tackle the dilemma 
between increasing process differentiation in the European integration 
project and the necessity to improve the relationship between the EU 
and its citizens. The underlying idea is to use concrete policy projects 
– past examples comprise the single market and the European 
Monetary Union – in order to enhance the capability of the citizens to 
identify with the European project, which would in turn help to ease 
the legitimacy crisis of the EU. Another effect would be to ‘cure’ the 
treaty fatigue of the EU’s citizens, making the people understand that 
institutional reform and concrete policy projects are two sides of the 
same coin, and therefore necessarily have to go together. It has to be 
left to further research which concrete policy areas could potentially 
provide a new ‘grand project’ that is capable of creating the necessary 
identification momentum between the Union and its citizens. 
However, it can already be established today that such a project has to 
be imbedded in a “multi-way integration process” that takes into 
account the necessity and factual existence of process differentiation 
in the European integration project. 
Generally, in addition to the normative conclusions concerning the 
most appropriate differentiation embodiment, the author claims that 
the integration logic of the EU has to be adjusted in order to solve the 
dilemma between the actual existence and increased necessity of 
process differentiation in the integration project on the one hand and 
the need for more concerted European action on the international stage 
as well as the rather distant relationship between the Union and its 
citizens on the other. In short, differentiation has to be communicated 
as inherent, necessary and normal in the European endeavour instead 
of a problem or a weakness. 
 
  63 
13 Sources and References 
Agence Europe, 2008. European Parliament President Sarkozy’s 
speech on Georgia/Russia, Financial Crisis, Energy/Climate 
Change, no. 9766, 21 October 2008. 
 
Babbie, Earl R. – Zaino, Jeanne – Halley, Fred S., 2006. Adventures in 
Social Research: Data Analysis Using SPSS 14.0 and 15.0 for 
Windows, Pine Forge Press. 
 
Bailes, Alyson J.K., 2009a. Europe and its security boundaries, 
unpublished manuscript. 
 
Bailes, Alyson J.K., 2009b. Europe in/and crisis, a lecture for EU-
Consent, Brussels, 26 March 2009. 
 
Bailes, Alyson J.K., 2008. National differences and European 
Strategy, guest lecture at Lunds Universitet during course “Europe 
in International Politics”, 13 October 2008. 
 
Biscop, Sven, 2008. Permanent structured cooperation and the future 
of ESDP, EGMONT paper 20. 
 
Brunsden, Jim, 2009a. Ten countries to hold meeting on enhanced co-
operation, European Voice, 22 January 2009, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ten-countries-to-
hold-meeting-on-enhanced-co-operation-/63687.aspx (last access: 
4 May 2009, 15:58). 
 
Brunsden, Jim, 2009b. Divorce initiative struggling to make headway, 
European Voice, 19 January 2009, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/01/divorce-initiative-
struggling-to-make-headway/63666.aspx (last access: 4 May 2009, 
16:07). 
 
Brunsden, Jim, 2008. Enhanced co-operation on divorce law?, 
European Voice, 9 October 2008. 
 
 
 
 
  64 
Checkel, Jeffrey T., 2003. Social Construction and European 
Integration, in: Nelsen, Brent F. – Stubb, Alexander, 2003: The 
European Union – Readings on Theory and Practice of European 
Integration, third edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 
London, 351 – 360. 
 
Corbett, Richard, 2008. [Comment] Ireland has a diplomatic victory 
but the real winner is Europe, EUobserver, 12 December 2008, 
http://euobserver.com/7/27296 (last access: 13 January 2009, 
11:22). 
 
Creswell, John W., 2007. Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design – 
Choosing Among Five Approaches, SAGE London. 
 
Cromme, Franz, 2007. Die primärrechtliche Absicherung der Einheit 
der EU bei der differenzierten Integration – Die Entwicklung bis 
zum Brüsseler Mandat 2007, in: Europarecht, Heft 6, 42. Jahrgang, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 821-828. 
 
Dahl, Robert A., 1994. A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness 
versus Citizen Participation, in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
109, No. 1, 23-34. 
 
Dyson, Kenneth – Marcussen, Martin, 2009. Transverse Integration: 
European Economic Governance between Unitary and 
Differentiated Integration, draft paper presented in a workshop on 
“Economic and Social Governance in the Making” organized by 
the College of Europe in Bruges within the framework of the EU-
Consent Network of Excellence, 7-8 April 2009.  
 
Emmanouilidis, Janis A., 2008. Conceptualizing a Differentiated 
Europe, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy 
(ELIAMEP). 
 
EurActiv.com, 2009. France and Germany: Together apart?, 16 
March 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/france-germany-
apart/article-180293 (last access: 5 May 2009, 12:36). 
 
EurActiv.com, 2008. Czechs reject Sarkozy's Eurogroup presidency 
plans, 24 October 2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/czechs-reject-sarkozy-
eurogroup-presidency-plans/article-176640 (last access: 12 
January 2009, 16:02). 
 
European Voice, 2008. Europe’s wounds will not heal easily, 9 
October 2008. 
  65 
 
Fernández, Christian, 2005. Medborgarskap efter Nationalstaten? – 
Ett konstruktivt förslag, Lund Political Studies 138, Department of 
Political Science, Lund University. 
 
Flick, Uwe, 2006. An introduction to qualitative research, third 
edition, SAGE London. 
 
Fischer, Joschka, 2000. From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts 
on the Finality of European Integration, speech at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, in: Joerges, Christian – Mény, 
Yves – Weiler, J.H.H. (eds.), 2000. What Kind of Constitution for 
What Kind of Polity? – Responses to Joschka Fischer, The Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies At The European 
University Institute, Florence, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 
MA, San Domenico (FI), Italy. 
 
Fox, John – Godement, François, 2009. A Power Audit of EU-China 
Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Report 
ECFR April 2009. 
 
Goldirova, Renata, 2008. Two-speed Europe may emerge over divorce 
rules, EUobserver 25 July 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26546 
(last access: 12 January 2009, 15:45). 
 
Hill, Christopher – Smith, Michael, 2005. Acting for Europe: 
Reassessing the European Union’s Place in International 
Relations, in: Hill, Christopher – Smith, Michael, 2005. 
International Relations and the European Union, Oxford 
University Press, 388-406. 
 
Holstein, James A. – Gubrium, Jaber F., 2004. The active interview, 
in: Silverman, David (ed.), 2004. Qualitative Research – Theory, 
Method and Practice, SAGE London, 140-161. 
 
Howorth, Jolyon – Nugent, Neill (eds.) – Paterson, Willian E. (eds.), 
2007. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, The 
European Union Series, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Jørgensen, Marianne – Phillips, Louise, 2002. Discourse analysis as 
Theory and Method, SAGE London. 
 
Krippendorff, Klaus, 2004. Measuring the Reliability of Qualitative 
Text Analysis Data, Quality & Quantity, 38, 787–800. 
 
  66 
Kvale, Steinar, 1996. InterViews – An Introduction to Qualitative 
Research Interviewing, SAGE London. 
 
Kurpas, Sebastian – De Clerck-Sachsse, Julia – Torreblanca, José I. – 
Ricard-Nihoul, Gaëtane, 2006. From Threat to Opportunity, 
Making Flexible Integration Work, European Policy Institutes 
Network (EPIN), Working Paper No. 15, September 2006. 
 
Laumen, Anne – Maurer, Andreas, 2006. Jenseits des “Permissive 
Consensus – Bevölkerungsorientierungen gegenüber Europäischer 
Integration im Wandel?”, Diskussionspapier der FG 1, 2006/13, 
August 2006, SWP Berlin. 
 
Ley Berry, Peter Sain, 2009. [Comment] Can Europe rise to Obama’s 
challenge?, EUobserver 23 January 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27463/?rk=1 (last access: 4 May 2009, 
22:20). 
 
Lindberg, Leon N. – Scheingold, Stuart A., 1997. Europe’s would be 
polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Mahony, Honor, 2009a. Czechs begin work on legal guarantees for 
Ireland, EUobserver, 9 January 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/18/27371 (last access: 13 January 2009, 
11:47). 
 
Mahony, Honor, 2009b. Brussels seeks to regain lead on economic 
crisis, EUobserver, 11 February 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27590/?rk=1 (last access: 11 February 
2009, 14:42). 
 
Mahony, Honor, 2009c. Member states grumble about splinter 
summits, EUobserver, 24 February 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27666/?rk=1 (last access: 5 May 2009, 
09:52). 
 
Mahony, Honor, 2009d. New member states call for EU solidarity, 
EUobserver, 01 March 2009 http://euobserver.com/9/27694/?rk=1 
(last access: 5 May 2009, 11:40). 
 
Marcussen, Martin, 2008. Diversity in Unity: EMU as a 
Differentiation Project, Copenhagen University, Denmark, 
unpublished manuscript. 
 
  67 
Miliband, David, 2009. Debate on an EU fit for purpose in a post 
2009 global age, speech at the London School of Economics, 09 
March 2009, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=14672130 (last access: 5 May 2009, 
08:57). 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew, 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose 
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Müller-Graff, Peter-Christian, 2007. ’Differenzierte Integration’: 
Konzept mit sprengender oder unitarisierender Kraft für die 
Europäische Union?, in: Integration (Baden-Baden), 30 (April) 2, 
129-139. 
 
Neuman, Marek, 2008. [Comment] Prague is as capable as any 
capital of taking over EU helm, EUobserver, 19 November 2008, 
http://euobserver.com/843/27123 (last access: 12 January 2009, 
16:04). 
 
Phillips, Leigh, 2009. Spain to push for EU economic governance 
when at presidency helm, EUobserver, 29 April 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/19/28030 (last access: 4 May 2009, 17:36). 
 
Phillips, Leigh, 2008. Europe a 'hobbled giant' by 2025, US 
intelligence report predicts, EUobserver, 21 November 2008, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27158/?rk=1 (last access: 12 January 
2009, 16:08). 
 
Rapley, Tim, 2004. Interviews, in: Seale, Clive – Giampietro, Gobo – 
Jaber, Gubrium F – Silverman, David, 2004. Qualitative Research 
Practice, SAGE London, 15-33. 
 
Risse, Thomas, 2004. Social Constructivism and European 
Integration, in: Wiener, Antje – Diez, Thomas, 2004. European 
Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, 159-176. 
 
Runner, Philippa, 2009. Financial crisis threatens east-west divide in 
EU, EUobserver, 26 February 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27681/?rk=1 (last access: 5 May 2009, 
09:24). 
 
Schäuble, Wolfgang – Lamers, Karl, 1994. Überlegungen zur 
europäischen Politik (Schäuble-Lamers-Papier), CDU/CSU 
position paper, 01.09.1994, www.cducsu.de. 
 
  68 
Schimmelfenning, Frank, 2004. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in: 
Wiener, Antje – Diez, Thomas, 2004. European Integration 
Theory, Oxford University Press, 75-94. 
 
Seale, Clive – Giampietro, Gobo – Jaber, Gubrium F – Silverman, 
David, 2004. Introduction: Inside Qualitative Research, in: Seale, 
Clive – Giampietro, Gobo – Jaber, Gubrium F – Silverman, David, 
2004. Qualitative Research Practice, SAGE London, 1-14. 
 
Strassel, Christophe, 2009. Eine Wirtschaftsregierung für Europa: 
Französische Utopie oder europäische Notwendigkeit?, 
Frankreich-Analyse, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 2009. 
 
Stubb, Alexander C.-G., 1996. A Categorization of Differentiated 
Integration, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 
2, 283. 
 
Tcherneva, Vessela, 2009. [Comment] Bridging Europe’s solidarity 
gap, EUobserver, 27 February 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/27693/?rk=1 (last access: 4 May 2009, 
21:09). 
 
Thym, Daniel, 2004. Ungleichzeitigkeit und europäisches 
Verfassungsrecht, Nomos, 1. Auflage. 
 
Thym, Daniel, 2006. Supranationale Ungleichzeitigkeit im Recht der 
europäischen Integration, in: Europarecht, Heft 5, Sep-Okt 2006, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 637-655. 
 
Titscher, Stefan – Meyer, Michael – Wodak, Ruth – Vetter, Eva, 2000. 
Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis, SAGE London. 
 
Vucheva, Elitsa, 2009. EU still ‘digesting’ 2004 enlargement five 
years on, EUobserver, 01 May 2009, 
http://euobserver.com/9/28049/?rk=1 (last access: 4 May 2009, 
17:16). 
 
Weidenfeld, Werner - Emmanouilidis, Janis A. – Metz, Almut, 2006. 
Die strategischen Antworten Europas, CAP Analyse, Ausgabe 4, 
September 2006, Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe Politik. 
 
Winkler, Heinrich August, 2009. Was hält Europa zusammen? Die 
Europäische Union zwischen Erweiterung und Vertiefung, in: 
Decker, Frank – Höreth, Marcus (Hrsg.), 2009. Die Verfassung 
Europas – Perspektiven des Integrationsprojektes, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. 
  69 
 
Zervakis, Peter, 2006. “Differentiated Integration”: An Alternative 
Path to Classical Integration?, in: The Federalist (Paria), 48 
(2006) 3, 205-213. 
 
Zielonka, Jan, 2000. Enlargement and the Finality of European 
Integration, in: Joerges, Christian – Mény, Yves – Weiler, J.H.H. 
(eds.), 2000. What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? – 
Responses to Joschka Fischer, The Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies At The European University Institute, Florence, 
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, San Domenico (FI), Italy. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Martin Marcussen, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Institut for 
Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet, 4 March 2009 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Alyson J.K. Bailes, Visiting Professor, Department of Political 
Science, University of Iceland, 15 April 2009 in Reykjavik, 
Iceland. 
 
  70 
14 Appendix 
Appendix 1 
Differentiation Inside and Outside the 
European Union Framework 
 
  71 
Appendix 1: Differentiation inside and outside the European Union framework 
 
EU framework 
Inside 
Institutional/formal differentiation 
Outside 
Political/informal differentiation 
Embodiment Different speeds Avant-garde Opt-out policy Politics of alliances 
Key features 
• Remain open to all member 
states 
• Conditions for participation 
• Institutionalisation: 
enhanced cooperation 
• Means of last resort 
• Strong Franco-German alliance 
(Fischer speech 2000) 
• Avant-garde as driving force for 
completion of political 
integration 
• Notion of leadership 
• Mostly used form of differentiation 
• Allows countries to remain outside 
deepened cooperation in (sub-)policy 
areas 
• Differentiated acquis also applies to 
future member states 
• A group of countries intensifies cooperation on the 
basis of intergovernmental mechanisms outside the 
EU framework 
• Limitations: Art. 4 (3) TEU-L and areas of exclusive 
EU competence 
• Respect of and benefit from the Union’s single institutional framework 
• Preserve supranational powers and the composition of the Commission, EP and ECJ 
• Limit anarchic and uncontrolled use of flexibility, guaranteeing a high level of calculability 
• Ensured high level of democratic legitimacy 
• Reduced risk of a confrontational split between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ 
Strengths 
Possibilities 
• Changing leading coalitions 
• Learning environment for 
hesitant countries 
• Ensured binding core 
• Potential driving force for more 
political integration for a number 
of countries 
• Overcome overall blockades 
• Learning process for countries that are 
not ready yet 
• Positive democratic effect 
• Well-tried mechanism 
• Can result in new integrationist dynamics 
(use of opt-ins) 
• Sometimes necessary condition for successful 
differentiation 
 circumvent legal restrictions 
 circumvent political hurdles (domaine réservés) 
 reasons of capability 
 potential usefulness of informality 
• Potential disruptive effects on integration process 
Weaknesses 
Risks 
• Enhanced cooperation never 
been used so far 
• Countries hesitant because of 
the fear of peer pressure 
• Legal provisions are perhaps 
too tight (nine countries 
threshold) 
• Potentially leads to 
permanent exclusion of some 
member states 
• Establishes differences on a 
permanent basis 
• Usually the same countries form 
permanent leading group 
• Creates mistrust, two-class EU 
• Linked to concept of periphery 
• EU à la carte (pick-and chose) 
• Makes EU less transparent, less coherent 
and less solidary 
• Potential disruptive effects on integration process 
• Exclusion of EU institutions, could harm community 
method 
• Inclusion of outsiders depends on political 
willingness of insiders 
• Problem of double structures, inefficiency, waste of 
resources 
• Lack of democratic legitimacy on European and 
national level 
• Decrease of trust & obstruction of EU cooperation 
• Potential problematic inclusion of external acquis 
into EU 
Examples 
• EMU 
• Treaty of Prüm 
• Potentially divorce law 
• Franco-German axis • Schengen (IE, GB) 
• EMU (GB, DK, (SE)) 
• ESDP (DK) 
• JHA/PJC (DK, GB, IE) 
• Charter of Fundamental Rights (GB, PL) 
• Especially foreign, security and defence policy 
• Potentially social policy issues 
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Appendix 2 
Opt-out Policy in Practice 
Current and potential future opt-outs concern the Schengen Agreement, the 
Economic and Monetary Union, European Security and Defence Policy, 
Justice and Home Affairs, European citizenship, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. The 
respective countries affected are the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Poland. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom have opt-outs from the implementation of 
the Schengen acquis.62 The UK furthermore secured an opt-out from having to 
introduce the euro in the initial Maastricht Treaty negotiations while Denmark 
did so later after a failed referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Following a 
negative referendum on euro adoption in 2003, Sweden only has a de facto 
opt-out on the euro, as it did not formally negotiate an opt-out on this matter. 
The country did not join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) 
and so deliberately failed to fulfil the criteria for introducing the euro. The 
Commission and the European Central Bank tacitly accept the Swedish 
derogation. 
Denmark negotiated a whole package of opt-outs following the negative 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In order to secure the acceptance 
of the Danish people in a second referendum, in 1993 four opt-outs had been 
established in the so-called Edinburgh Agreement concerning – already stated 
– EMU63, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)64, Police and Judicial 
                                                                                                                                              
 
62 Ireland only joined the UK in adopting this opt-out to keep the Ireland–United Kingdom 
Common Travel Area in effect. 
63 Denmark is not obliged to participate in the third phase of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, i.e. to replace the Danish krone with the euro. 
64 Denmark does not participate in the European Union's foreign policy where defence is 
concerned and does not contribute troops to missions conducted under the auspices of the 
European Union. 
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Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJC) or Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)65 
and the citizenship of the European Union66. 
After the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon two additional opt-outs 
will emerge. The first concerns the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union67 from which Poland and the United Kingdom have opted out. 
This means that the European Court of Justice will not be able to rule on issues 
related to the Charter if they are brought to courts in Poland or the UK.68 The 
second regards Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters in which 
Ireland and the UK have opted out of the change from unanimous decisions to 
qualified majority voting. However, both states will be able to opt-in on these 
voting issues on a case-by-case basis. 
Former opt-outs are comprised of the British opt-out from the Social 
Protocol, negotiated by John Major in 1991. However, Tony Blair abolished 
this opt-out immediately after coming to power in 1997. 
The debate about granting more opt-outs to Ireland, mainly concerning the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
has recently emerged against the background of the negative referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
                                                                                                                                              
 
65 The JHA opt-out exempts Denmark from certain areas of home affairs. Significant parts of 
these areas were transferred from the third European Union pillar to the first under the 
Amsterdam Treaty; Denmark's opt-outs from these areas were kept valid through additional 
protocols. Acts made under those powers are not binding on Denmark except for those relating 
to Schengen, which are instead conducted on an intergovernmental basis with Denmark. 
66 The citizenship opt-out stated that European citizenship did not replace national citizenship; 
this opt-out was rendered meaningless when the Amsterdam Treaty adopted the same wording 
for all members. 
67 The Charter is a part of the Lisbon Treaty. 
68 Poland's then ruling party, Law and Justice, mainly noted concerns that it might force Poland 
to grant homosexual couples the same kind of benefits which heterosexual couples enjoy, while 
the UK was worried that the Charter might be used to alter British labour law, especially as 
relates to allowing more strikes. 
